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I. INTRODUCTION* 
It may be an interesting point of debate why it is that 
even though for more than a half of its length the Senegal River 
flows through a desert, there has not been a successful programme 
to harness its water and develop irrigation infrastructure of 
the kind that evolved in Egypt and Sudan. That point is made 
more curious by the fact that the river attracted considerable 
interest over the past two centuries, from former colonial 
powers ruling the area as well as from the post-colonial govern-
ments . 
The point is that attempts at organization of infrast-
ructure and production system, particularly for irrigated agri-
culture, have in fact, been made. However, such attempts have 
been either generally feeble and failed to flourish or were 
overcome by overwhelming counterveilling political forces. But 
such attempts and the dynamics which dictated their demise will 
only be mentioned in this paper in passing. The concern here 
is primarily with what are the current development programmes under 
the aegis of the Organization for the Development of Senegal 
River Basin. 
+ The information in this paper was collected as part of broader 
study o,n "The Contribution of Drainage Basin Organization to 
Development in Africa" covering Senegal, Niger, Kagera and 
Limpopo. The research was done through direct free interviews 
supported by primary official documents and other publications. 
1. A great deal of information on history and planned programmes 
of the OMVS is condensed in Pierre Platon's article, "The 
Development of the Senegal River" in Marches Tropicaux No.1649 
17 April 19 81, 35 pp. For this point see page 4. 
On the other hand, what has been called the dydraulic civiliz-
ations evolved in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China, where 
the growth of ancient civilizations were associated with the 
management of water resources of key rivers for agricultural 
productivity. In this regard, the irrigation infrastructure 
and practice in Egypt and Sudan, using the Nile waters, is 
unmarched anywhere in Africa. See Dante Caponera's "Water Laws 
in Hydraulic Civilizations" in G.L. Ulmen (Ed.) Society and 
History (The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1978) pp 91-106. 
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The Organization Pour la Mise en valeur du Fleuve Senegal 
(OMVS) was established by the adoption of two instruments: La 
Convention Relative au Status du Flewe Senegal, being the 
articulation of the legal status of the Senegal River and the 
basic imperatives for their joint management; and La Convention 
Portant Creation de 1'Organization Pcur la Mise er. Valeur du 
Fleuve Senegal, being the actual Corvention establishing the 
Organization and stipulating its purpos-es. Both instruments 
were sighed on March 11, 1972 by the Heads of State of Mali, 
Mauritania and Senegal. 
The framework and programme of work established and 
initiaxed under the OMVS Convention remain the latest attempts 
at organizing the management of the waters of the Senegal River. 
This effort already described as "a unique experiment in inter-
national river basin planning"' is important for a number of 
reasons, the most prominent o:' which are two-fold: First, as 
observed earlier, the Senegal basin has aTtracxed attention and 
intentions towards its actual management for productive purposes 
Therefore, it should readily have some advanced experience for 
other international basins in Africa. Secondly, the OMVS treaty 
was adopted at the beginning of the infamous drought which has 
imperilled what is called tie Sahel Zone for the last decade, 
and that basin is right at the core of that zone. Besides, that 
was also the beginning of -he problems associated with the 
spiralling costs of hy droc£rbons. Consequently, more attention 
was being given to alternative sources of energy, of which hydro 
electric power is an important option. For these reasons, too, 
the OMVS's selection of envelopment projects and some of the 
implications of their implementation should be a matter of 
interest. But ultimately, indeed, an important lesson to draw 
from the OMVS programme is that it is an attempt to implement 
the commitments expressed in a treaty. 
2. See Pa?nall, Theodore and Albert E. Utton, "The Senegal 
Valle^ Authority: A Unique Experiment in International 
Rive- Basin Planning", Indiana Law Journal, Vol.51 No.2 
Win-er 1976 pp. 233-256 .
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Africa, with about fifty-four drainage basins with inter-
national character, covering about one half of the continent's 
total area, needs more of the experiments, hopefully to alleviate 
the widespread food deficits attributed to drought, and poor 
economic performance often attributed to high price of imported 
hydrocarbon as a source of energy. 
The task for this paper is limited primarily to that of 
a general expose of the development programmes intended for the 
implementation of the OMVS treaty. 
Accordingly, the next section will give a general physical 
setting of what is referred to as the Senegal River and its basin 
Section III will outline the OMVS treaty, in a nutshell, very 
parricularly to show its place in historical setting as well as 
to outline the salient purposes and the intended modes of 
implementation. Section IV will then outline the planned develop 
ment projects, particularly in irrigated agriculture, hydro-
electric power generation and river navigation as a mode of 
transport. The latter, as well as livestock breeding and fish-
ing, will get rather limited treatment. 
The central mode of facilitating these projects is by 
harnessing the river water through dams, flow control and dis-
tribution of the water. The natural consequence is major 
ecological changes within the basin. In Section V, we shall 
give a general outline of some of the major environmental 
implications and, where appropriate, possible remedies. 
Section VI will look at some of the financial implic-
ations of the implementation of the programmes. Notably, the 
section shall outline the financial needs, the sources identi-
fied so far, the cost of the money and allocation of respons-
ibility for repayment of the loans. The last section will 
make some general comments on the prospects ahead of the OMVS, 
drawing on the past experience with implementation of similar 
development programmes. 
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II. THE GENERAL PHYSICAL SETTING 
The Senegal is generally used in reference to that parti-
cular river system, whose total length is variably stated to be 
anywhere from 1,600 to 1,800 kilometres. Strictly speaking, the 
Senegal refers to the trunk of that river from Bafoulable in Mali, 
the confluence of the Bafing and the Bakoye, to its mouth at 
Saint Louis. Thus, the latter two would ordinarily be considered 
as the main, but not only, tributaries of the Senegal. 
The Bafing, literally meaning "black river" in the local 
vernacular, is the longest of the tributaries. It originates 
from an area approximately 800 metres above sea level on the 
Fouta Djallon mountains in Guinea, and covers a distance of 3 
about 750 kilometres by the time it reaches Bafoulabe. It is 
also estimated that the flow of the Bafing at the confluence 
averages t30m3 per second, which is over1 one half of the average 
flow of the Senegal River. 
The Bekoye, literally the "whate river" in local verna-
cular, originates largely on the highlands of Mali and Guinea, 
the highest point of its sources being approximately 650 kilo-
metres, the Bekoye has several tributaries on its right bank, 
which places such tributaries in the Malian territory. But at 
Bafoulabe this river releases about 170m^ of water per second 
which is less than one half of the volume discharged by the 
Bafing. 
There are five or six other tributaries downstream from 
Bafoulabe, with the three major ones on the right bank, being 
intermittent and therefore making only minute contribution to 
the flow of the Senegal. They are Kclombine, Karakoro and Gor-
gol with sources in Mauritania. The most important tributary 
in the downstream category is the Feleme which, like the Bafing, 
(in fact, similar in altitude too) has its sources in the Fouta 
Djallon Mountains. Its full length is approximately 6 50 kilo-
3. Most of the information on the general physical setting is 
derived frori Marches Tropicaux 17 April, 19 81, loc. cit. 
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metres, and contributes an average volume of 200m3 per second, 
or the equivalent of 6.3 billion cubic metres per year. 
In most of its length, the Feleme forms part of the 
international boundary between Senegal and Mali, just as part 
of the length of the Karakoro, on the right bank of the Senegal 
River, forms par.t of the territorial boundary between Mauritania 
and Mali. But from its confluence with the Felejne to its mouth, 
the Senegal River mostly forms the boundary between Mali and 
Senegal Republics. The drainage system is, therefore, inter-
national, par excellence,, covering Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and 
Senegal. 
The total area of the basin is estimated at 289,000 
2 2 square kilometres of which 155,000 km is m Mali; 27,500 km 
is in Senegal; 75,000 km2 is in Mauritania; and 21,000 km2 is 
in Guinea. This is equivalent to approximately 10 percent of 
the total area of the basin states. The 'population within 
the basin, of the three members of the OMVS, is about 1.6 million 
people, or 14 per cent of the population of the three estates. 
As pointed out already, one of the controlling factors in this 
region is rainfall which is rather scanty and unevenly distributed. 
But, on the average, such scanty rains fall from mid-June to 
the first half of October, totalling four months. The rest of 
the year is characterized by desert-type drought.^ In fact, 
about 90 per cent of Mauritania and of Mali are perfect deserts.6 
This erratic climatic condition also varies the volume of the 
river flow considerably, with xhe flow during the eight dry 
months falling far below 300 cubic metres per second. 
Indeed, drought during the eight months from October to 
June, gets the volume of water sometimes far below that mark. • 
4. The areas of the three members of OMVS.are given-as follows: 
Mali - 1,204,000 km?; Mauritania - 1,170.000 km2; Senegal -
197,000 km2. See ibid p. 14. 
5. See these observations in Ronald Bornstein's "The Organization 
of Senegal River States" The Journal of Modern African Studies. 
Vol. 10 No.2 (1972) pp. 267, 273. 
6. Marches Tropicaux op. cit. d.14 
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However, the 300 cubic metres per second is a significant policy 
matter in planning development of the Senegal basin. During 
the dry season, the level of the Senegal River is virtually at 
sea level and the Senegal flow pressure is negligible thereby 
permitting the incursion of the salt water tide from the Atlantic. 
Frequently, the salt intrusion at high tide goes as far as Dagana, 
but it has been known to extend beyond Dagana, as far as Fanaye 
creek, 200 kilonetres from Saint Louis. As a consequence, the 
agricultural use of the water is impeded and the inhabitants 
are forced to consume water with that high salinity. In fact, 
it has been established that a total of between 450,000 and 480,000 
hectares economically irrigated even though initially, a 
smaller ^ rea may be scheduled for cultivation. 
The foregoing are development imperatives impeded by 
qualitative consequences of the low level of Senegal waters. 
Bu-' that level of the waters of the river impede-one further 
cEvelopment activity, namely, navigation, which should be a cheap 
means of transportation to the hinterlands. Mali, which is 
a land-locked state, depends on overland transportation through 
either Ivory Coast or Senegal with all their limitations. Only 
a flow regulation of the Senegal River, which maintains the 
volume at a minimum of 300 cubic metres per second would provide 
sufficient draft facilitating regular navigation, at least from 
Saint Louis to Kayes in Mali, which is about 950 kilometres. 
The physical condition of the Senegal river also gives 
it substantial potentials for hydroelectric power generation. 
Since the river flows from Fouta Djallon highlands the declevity 
responsible for reasonable dam sites is in Mali, particularly 
after the confluence of Bafing and 3ekoye. But the second 
'-lighest potential, totalling 800 million Kwh is at Manantali o 
o the Bafing. The others are Galougo 1,520 million Kwh; 
Porbassi 104 million KWh; Small Goina 550 million KWh; and 
Fel>u 40.0 miliioi. KWh. These, however, are equivalent to two 
thirls of the total estimated hydro-power potential of the 0MVS. 
7. ibid p.16. 
8. lor estimates see River Senegal (OMVS, 1979) p. 16. 
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There are a number'of other natural resources to be men-
tioned in passing, in the physical setting. Notable among these 
are mineral resources, particularly iron ore in the Feleme 
valley and between Koulikoro ana Kayes in Mali. There are also 
notable deposits of bauxite in Mali and phosphates in Mauritania 
Forestry is particularly abundant in the Upper-basin, and there 
are available a varieties of species of fish in the Senegal 
River. 
The foregoing physical features and the resource poten-
tials constitute the natural resources which would be mobilized 
for socio-economic development within the cooperation framework 
created by the OMVS. 
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Hi. THE OMVS TREATY - IN A NUTSHELL 
The OMVS was, indeed, the latest, if not also a culmin-
ation, of attempts to study or organize towards a systematic 
management of the resources of the Senegal basin. In fact, 
such efforts commenced early in this century, under the aegis 
of the French colonial administration which governed the basin 
territories within the framework of French West Africa including 
French Guinea, Soudan (later to be Mali), Senegal and Mauritania. 
Although the. headquarters of that administration was in Dakar, 
the actual decision were taken in Paris. And within that con-
text the organization of the utilization of the natural resources, 
including water for irrigated agriculture were a part of the 
colonial policy. The attempts at organizing the utilization 
of the basin's resources were fragmentary and unsystematic, 
occasionally only sectoral in approach. And this is why the 
Statute and Convention adopted in March, 1972 are such an 
important turning point in the evolution of concepts for the 
development of the basin states through regulation of the flow f 
of the river. 
The historical perspective is nevertheless significant 
in setting the context within which the OMVS and its development 
plans were to emerge. 
The Antecedents 
The long series of initiatives taken towards the develop- : 
ment of the Senegal basin have been recounted in a number of g 
existing literature. They show that even though the first j. mission by French emissaries to consider any planned development t 
in the basin was in 1918 the first formal framework was actually : 
9. The items cited above can all be references on the antecedent? 
to the OMVS, however, the most comprehensive of all is the j 
Marches Tropicaux 17 April 1981 crp. cit. from which most of 
the information m this section is derived. 
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started in 1935 when the MEFS (Mission d'etudes du Fleuve 
Senegal) was established. Its terms of reference included to 
conduct and execute all research and experimental work through-
out the length of the "Senegal River, aimed at developing it from 
the triple stand point of agriculture, navigation and power 
production within the three French territories in the Senegal 
basin. Although the mission worked for three years producing 
topological, "nydrological and geological studies, no concrete 
projects directly emanated from that work. 
What was expected to be an executive function was later 
assigned to MAS (Mission d'amenagement du Senegal) which was 
established in 1938. Its first commitnent was to irrigate 
agriculture, specifically for cotton production, which it 
started in Podor region, upstream from Dagana. But these efforts 
were interrupted by the expansion of conflicts during World 
War II. After the War, MAS did not follow up on these opera-
tional works. Instead it resorted to a number of uncoordinated 
sectoral studies. By 1959, MAS, with its rudimentary functions 
were treated as a joint endeavour of the three states which 
were then preparing for independence. However, when Soudan 
became independent (and changed its name to Mali) it actually 
withdrew from that organization. 
On July 25, 1963, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, 
the first time as independent states, signed the Agreement con-
cerning the Development of the Senegal River Basin. Under that 
Agreement, they established the Inter-State Committee whose 
purpose was to initiate an integrated programme for the develop-
ment of the basin's resources. The notion of "integrated prog-
ramme" was actually predicted on the agreed precept that the 
Senegal River and its tributaries was international in its 
character. By February 1964, the four states were able to adopt 
general principles for the management of the resources of the 
river, particularly flow control *co facilitate promotion of 
irrigation, hydropower generation and navigation. 
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This set of post-independence developments seem to have 
stirred the zeal of the basin states which were enthusiastic 
for closer economic as well as political collaboration among the 
independent African States. The Inter-State Committee was, on 
24 March, 1968, replaced by the OERS (Organization des Etats 
Riverains du Senegal) adopted by a treaty signed by the Heads 
of State of the four countries at Labe in Guinea. 
It was recognized, as a position of the contracting 
states, that, in addition to the development of the Senegal River, 
the objectives of this new organization were also the harmoniz-
ation of the States' national development plans and the implement 
ation of concerted policies for sectorial development."1"^ Thus, 
the mandate of the OERS extended to the overall questions of 
national development plans and implementation. It was also 
particularly novel that the Article of the OERS Convention gave 
the organization a role in the politics and foreign policies of 
the member states. 
Despite the rather lofty intentions, the OERS was dis-
solved as a treaty framework four years later before it had 
actually implemented any framework. Amid several political 
problems which confronted the organization during that period, 
it managed to consider a number of possible projects and the 
ideas were to remain beyond the life of OERS itself. Before 
specifying the proposed projects, we give a brief outline of 
the political problems, because history is notorious for re-
peating itself, even where our hopes are to the contrary. 
The beginning of the problems was in November 196 8, when 
Madeibo Keita was overthrown as President of Mali and succeeded 
by Moussa Traore. This shock, seemed like forceful removal of 
a member of a fraternity, and particularly to Sekou Toure whose 
10. The River Senegal (1979) op•cit. p. 8. See these purposes 
as articulated in Articles 1-5 of the OERS Convention. See 
also the detailed dis'cussion of the OERS in the exclusive 
article by Bornstein, o£. cit. 
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other friend, Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana had been overthrown. 
Apparently, Toure withdrew support from OERS henceforth, a 
factor which paralysed the OERS for the rest of 13 6 8 and through-
out 1969 . 
At the diplomatic-initiative of President Ould Daddah, 
the four Heads of States met in Conakry on 3 February 19 70 and 
this resuscitated the OERS, at least, throughout 1970. Eut 
then the invasion of Guinea, on 22 November 1970, by unidenti-
fied forces generated suspicion which was not helped by the 
bad relation between Guinea and Senegal,"especially when Guinea 
accused Senegal of amassing troops along their border. Attempts 
to resolve the bilateral conflicts between the two were only 
briefly eased in March 1971 when, at the invitation of the OERS 
Executive Secretary, the four Heads of State met for the Round 
Table on Prospects for the Integrated Development of the Senegal 
River Basin. The main focus of the meeting was to encourage 
prospective donors to support the construction of one or more 
dams for irrigation and for hydropower generation. 
It soon became evident, however, that the political 
problems would not permit the OERS to.function. In fact one 
author reports that by October 1971, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal 
had formally submitted their instruments denouncing the OERS 
treaty and resigning their membership, although these had not 
been made public-,'^ Thus, the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
of the OERS, which mer at Nouakchott in December 1971, issued 
a communique which only indirectly signalled the dissolution of 
the OERS. 
Meanwhile, the OERS secretariat had established pointers 
to areas of possible collaborative development of the Senegal 
Basin. The Executive Secretariat presented such studies at the 
12 
March 19 71 Round Table mentioned above. Numerous reports were 
issued on costs, benefits and alternative approaches to develop-
ment of the Senegal basin. The studies included mineral resources 
11. See Bornstein, op.cit. p. 283. 
12. ibid p. 274. 
- 12 - IDS/DP 2 83 
development, agronomy, demography, desalination, hydroelectric 
power production, industrial development, health and the environ-
ment. It was clearly indicated that to implement these objec-
tives, there would be need for two dams, one at the Manantali 
in Mali and possibly another one near the delta. Participants 
included UNDP, IBRD, African Development Bank, European Develop-
ment Fund, FAO, Canada, France, USA, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Very clearly then, by the time OERS was dissolved, the 
basin states had very definite ideas about the kinds of develop-
ment project's they should embark on and with what financial 
needs. Ironically, the collapse of the OERS was actually a 
result of the detraction from matters of development of the 
Senegal basin; after all, the basin states had agreed on the 
necessity to cooperate in such development. That fact should 
perhaps have made it easy for those states which were still 
interested in the collaborative development to agree on the 
treaty framework and the procedure for its implementation. 
The OMVS Treaty and the Statuxe 
When the Senegal basin states initiated the move for an 
organization to succeed the OERS they were to take account of 
two. major antecedent developments. First, they were to base 
the new framework on the results of studies and deliberations 
on the possible projects within the basin and ways of initiat-
ing them towards prosperity of the needy nation-states. 
Secondly, they were cognisant of the causes of the political 
conflicts that led to the collapse of the OERS as a development 
organization. Therefore, it can be suggested that they started 
from a position of advantage. In fact, the very announcement 
of the dissolution of the OERS marked the beginning of the 0MVS.1:> 
On March 11, 1972, the Heads of State of only three of 
the basin states: Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, meeting at 
Nouakchott signed-two basic instruments for the legal regime of 
13. ibid p. 283 
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organization for th6 management and development of the resources 
of the Senegal Basin". The first one was the Convention Relating 
• It 
to the Legal Status of the Senegal River; the second was the 
actual Convention Establishing the Organization for the Develop-
ment of the Senegal River (OMVS). Then two subsidiary, but 
significant conventions were adopted at a later date: One con-
cerned the Legal Status of the Works of common interest; the 
other was on the financing of such works. Only their general 
outline needs to be given here briefly. 
The Statute and the Legal Status of the Senegal 
The Statute had a precise purpose and that is reflected 
in the declaration of its principles in the preamble. First, 
the preamble noted the Charters of the United nations signed in 
1945 and that of the Organization of African Unity signed in 
1963. Then it declared the consideration that the rational and 
coordinated management and exploitation of the natural resources 
of the Senegal Basin would promote economic cooperation cf the 
basin states. Further, they considered that it was essential 
to have a concurrence that general management of the Senegal 
basin required the regulation and utilization of its waters for 
the three purposes: energy production, irrigation and navigation. 
Finally, they declared that utilization of .the river must permit 
the principle of free navigation ar.c equal treatment of all 
users of the river. 
Within the scope of the foregoing principles, the Statute 
declared in Article 1 that Senegal River, including its tribut-
aries, is declared an international river on the territories of 
the three contracting states. On the basis cf this declaration, 
the Statute proceeded to stipulate the functions that would be 
influenced by the international personality of the Senegal river. 
14. The Convention on the Status of the River has been referred 
to as the Statute to distinguish it from the Convention 
establishing the OMVS. That is the general reference in the 
literature cited above and to avoid confusion, that is main-
tained here. 
- 14 - IDS/DP 2 83 
The most elaborate set of functions covered in Chapter 
III, articles 6-10 relates to freedom of navigation and trans-
portation through the river. The contracting parties guarantee 
equal rights for navigation of the river and use of ports for 
all citizens,, the commercial vessels and goods of the contract-
ing states as well as vessels chartered by one or more of these 
states. Any taxes levied must be proportionate to the services 
rendered and should on no-account be discriminatory. 
It further stipulates that the same freedom and equality 
of treatment would apply to reads, railways and lateral channels 
created for the specific purpose of by-passing unnavigable zones 
or defective reaches of navigation canals in the river or its 
tributaries. It is also to facilitate common regulations to 
ensure security and control of navigation. Besides, each con-
tracting party was required to maintain the sectors of the 
river on their territories in safe and good state of navig-
ability, in accordance with the stated common regulations. 
The exploitation of the river for agricultural and indus-
trial purposes are dealt with in Chapter II of the Statute, con-
stituted by Articles 4 and 5. The central and novel provision 
here is the requirement for prior approval by the contracting 
states, of any project that is likely to significantly modify 
the characteristics of the river. A project document is accord-
ingly required to be circulated to other contracting states and 
in it should be specified the possible impact on: the river 
regime; the navigability of the river; agricultural and indust-
rial uses of the river and its waters; the water quality; the 
flora and fauna of the river; and the general water quantity 
and water table. 
By that original Statute, the contracting parties .under-
took not to denounce the terms of the Statute within less than 
ten years. But the contracting parties realized very quickly 
that this was too short a period. The gestation period of most 
of the projects might last that long. Accordingly, at their 
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meeting at Nouakchott on -16 Dece-mber 19 75 , the Heads of States 
adopted a resolution amending Article 17 of the Statute so as 
to extend the period from ten to ninety-nine (99) years.15 
Where any dispute arose relating to application or inter-
pretation of the Statute, Article 18 provided that resort may 
be had to the Commission on conciliation and Arbitration of the 
Organization of African Unity. In the event that no resolution 
is obtained, then the parties may take the dispure to the 
International Court of Justice. The parties also opened other 
options available within the United Nations system by requiring 
that the Convention be registered with the U.N. Secretariat in 
accordance with Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. 
Thus, the broad legal status of the Senegal was estab-
lished and general guidelines provided for the management of 
its natural resources. This sets the scene for the OMVS 
treaty which sets out the rights and obligations of the con-
tracting states on the management of the resources for develop-
ment. 
The OMVS Treaty Proper 
The 19 72 Convention which established the OMVS nay be 
examined broadly in six parts: (i) Establishment or constitu-
tion of the Organization and its application ratione loci; 
(ii) General scope of application, ratione materiae; (iii) 
General structure and principal organs of the Organization and 
the functions in relation to the responsibilities of the organs; 
(iv) Legal status of the OMVS projects; (v) The broad legal 
aspects of funding for the projects; and (vi) Some general 
provisions. 
15. Initially, the amendment was recommended by Recommendation 
No. 3/75/CMAML.B of the Council of Ministers on 12 June 
1975. The Heads of State Resolution is Ho. 5/75/C.C.E.G./ 
MN.N of 16 December 1975. 
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Establishment and area of application 
The organization for the cooperative management and 
development of the Senegal river basin was formally established 
by Article 1 of the OMVS Convention. 
The area of application of the Convention is implicitly 
suggested by that referen.ee to the Senegal River Basin. But 
explicitly, the area of its application is specified in the 
Statute which specified the legal status of the basin. There-
fore, it was sufficient that the third preambular paragraph of 
the OMVS Convention noted the provision of the Statute which 
was adopted by the Heads of States and Governments on the same 
day. Very particularly that preambular paragraph refers to 
Articles 11 and 12 of the Statute (Title IV) which dealt with 
"Application" under which the contracting states undertook to 
coordinate all studies and works as well as the functioning of 
any of their mutual organization for the general utilization 
and management of the resources of the basin. 
The immediate point to co.nsider is that the main source 
of the Senegal River is in the Fouta Djallon mountains in Guinea, 
where sits the water tank of West Africa. But Guinea is not a 
contracting party to the OMVS. Thus, the Statute and the Con-
vention being res inter alios , would not apply to that portion 
of the river which is in Guinea. Thus, Mali remains the most 
critical member cf the organization even though, in the long 
run, it may be ideal to consider the unity of the Fouta Djallon 
mountains and to get the collaboration of Guinea in the OMVS to 
secure the source of the Senegal waters. 
The reasons why Guinea did not contract to the OMVS are 
stated in the discussion of the interface of OERS and OMVS, as 
having resulted, in part from the Guinea-Senegal relations at 
that time. But then Guinea has joined Senegal, the Gambia and 
Guinea Bissau in the Organization for the Development and Manage-
ment of Gambia Basin (OMVG). It is therefore conceived that 
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Guinea should and might appropriately accept the convention so 
that the terms of OMVS are applicable to all the four territo-
ries. In the process, the conservation and utilization of the 
resources may be effected on the basin-wide basis as provided 
for in the Statute on the legal status of the basin. Whenever 
it wishes to, Guinea may join the OMVS by submitting a written 
request to that effect, to the depository of the Convention as 
provided in Article 18. The depository is then required to 
refer the matter to the Member States who would perhaps gladly 
approve the request. Perhaps the decision would be easier for 
Guinea to make how, after the departure of Sekou Toure and 
Leopold Senghor. In fact, it may be easier to expedite if the 
present contracting states take the diplomatic initiative in 
some form of invitation. 
It is further presumable that, even though in the strict 
sense the convention applies to the Senegal basin (that 289,000 
square kilometres), the construction of the related regional 
infrastructure including roads, railways, power lines and tele-
communication lines would be done beyond the precise .basin but 
in the territories of the contracting states. 
The Subjects to which the convention applies 
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Convention gives a catch-
all function for the Organization in terms of "The Enforcement 
of the Convention of 11 March 1972 on the Status of the Senegal 
River". In fact that implies enforcement of the position legally 
recognizing -the river as one entity in its entirety. But it 
further requires the organization to promote and coordinate 
studies as well as development works of the basins resources. 
And thirdly, to implement any technical and economic duties 
assigned to it by the contracting states. Finally, by an amend-
ment adopted on 13 April 19 73, the organization is empowered 
to receive grants, raise loans and obtain'technical assistance. 
These rather broad functions have been further articu-
lated in a paper by the Legal Council of the 
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These rather broad functions have been further articu-
16 r 
lated in a paper by the Legal Counsel of the OMVS as follows: , 
Ca) Formulation of management policy on the resources of the 
Senegal basin. (b) Planning and programming, as well as coor-
dination of exploitation of natural resources of the Senegal 
basin and setting up of the development priorities in project 
of common interest to the basin states. (c) To implement 
studies and projects as-well as regional infrastructure. (d) 
To administer regional infrastructure through the agencies 
established by the organization and to establish regional 
standards for regulations, budget and financial administration, 
(e) To determine the priorities in the utilization of the water 
of the basin in order. (f) To determine the criteria for shar-
ing or apportionment of the basin waters in accordance with the ; 
procedures of the Permanent Water Commission (Commision Ferraanent; 
des Eaux). 
The Structure of the Organization and Function Principle Organs 
The OMVS has three principle organs, namely, the Con-
ference of the Heads cf State and Governments; the Council of 
Ministers; and the High Commission. Originally, the third 
organ was the Secretariat General headed by a corresponding 
title for the office holder. However, by an amendment adopted 
on December 17, 1S75, the position cf the High Commissioner 
was created as the permanent executive officer of the Organiz-
ation with a Secretary General as his deputy. 
Article 3 of the Convention designates the Conference of 
the Heads of States and Government as the supreme authority of 
the Organization, with the powers to define the policies for 
cooperation and development among and within the contracting 
states. Theoretically, it is supposed to meet once every year. 
But for reasons of economy, it meets biennially even though it 
16. The paper "Cadre Juridique et Institutionnel de la Cooper-
ation entre les Etats-membre de 1'Organization pur la Mise 
en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal by Sidi Mohamed Boubacar was 
presented at the Workshop on the Management of River and 
Lake Basins in West Africa organized by IDEP/ECA and OMVS 
and held at Dakar June 25/26 1986. See pp. 11-12. 
31. 
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is expected that in future and out of necessity it might meet 
17 • annually. It would be submitted, though, that unless it is 
found- vital for any specific reasons, the Summit can remain a 
biennial affair provided that there is a strong Council of 
Ministers. In that event, its function would amount to ratify-
ing and granting legitimacy to the implementation of the 
recommendations adopted by the Council of Ministers. Article 
4 simply provides that the Summit should meet as often as 
possible but it is Article S which requires its Chairmanship 
to rotate among the member states, every two years. This would 
ideally coincide with arrangements for biennial Conferences. 
Apart from convening and chairing the regular meetings , the 
Chairman is not expressly assigned any specific powers or res-
ponsibilities. In practice, it has been so arranged that the 
Conference of the Heads of State and Government is to be con-
vened on a date and venue acceptable to all the three members. 
This facilitates operation of Article 4 which requires that 
the decisions of the Conference are valid only if they are 
adopted unanimously. Besides, the requirement in Article 5 that 
all the decisions have binding effect among all contracting 
states requires a' consensual approach to decision-making. 
Thus, the biennial Conferences may, in fact, be an ideal 
arrangement for the OMVS Summit: A Conference of Heads of State 
and Government is sensitive in its procedure and decisions and 
therefore it should not be convened more often than is absolutely 
necessary. 
The Council of Ministers emerges as the organ with the 
central policy control and direction of the OMVS, as outlined 
in Articles 8-10 of the convention. 
It is composed of at least one Minister representing the 
contracting states. In practice, two or more ministers from 
one state may attend, depending on the agenda of the meeting. 
17. Elaborations given in ibid pp. 15-16. 
- 20 - IDS/DP 2 83 
Very often the items on agenda might cross the boundaries of 
more than one ministry. In which case the specific delegation 
! 
would unilaterally determine the head of the delegation. Article J 
9 provides that the chairmanship will rotate among the member 
states every two years, as in the case of the Summit. However, 
it does not say whether or not the two should coincide for the 
same state. 
The regular sessions of the Council are to be held twice 
every year._ However, extraordinary sessions may be convened 
on the suggestion of any one member. 
The functions of the Council of Ministers are articulated 
in Article 8 as the formulation and articulation of policy, on 
the utilization of resources and cooperative framework and 
operation of programmes; setting priorities for regional develop-, 
ment; and determination of the budget and financial contribution j 
18 
of member states. Members are enjoined to send representatives 
to the Council meetings where decisions are determined by unani- ; 
mity of votes and are subsequently binding on the contracting 
states. 
For its efficient operation, the Council of Ministers 
works with one "control organ" namely, the Financial Controller 
which comprises an accountant and an auditor. Besides, the 
Council works with three "Consultative Organs", namely, the 
1° Permanent Water Commission, ~ the Inter-State Committee for 
18. In the original Convention the establishment and functioning1 
of the Council of Ministers was dealt with in Article 8-11. Th< 
Amendment of December 11,1975 which also introduced the office 
of the High Commissioner superimposed on the Secretary General-
changed this. 
19. Since its establishment in 1975 by formal amendment of the 
Convention, making it Article 20, the Permanent Water Commi-
ssion has met only three times. Perhaps its operation will ; 
be active after completion of the two dams and serious questiol 
of water apportionment will be live. 
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20 Research for Agricultural Development (CIERDA); and the Con-
sultative Committee (CC).21 i 
Thus through consultation with these three Committees 
and regular sessions the Council of Ministers is expected to 
give adequate direction to the Executive Organs of the Organiz-
ation. In between the sessions the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers may, in case of emergency, consult with the member 
states and take any necessary measures, within the mandate of 
the Council, to safeguard the interests of the OMVS. In any 
event, in between sessions of the Council, the Chairman is ex-
pected to monitor the implementation of the Council's decisions 
as well as those of the Conference of the Heads of State and 
Government as the Council is 'actually responsible to the latter. 
The High Commission is The executive organ of the OMVS. 
Hierarchically, the High Commission is responsible to the Council 
of Ministers, even though ultimately it is presumed to implement 
the directives of the Conference of Heads of States and Govern-
ment. These functions are elaborated in Articles 11 and 19 of 
the Convention, adopted through the amendment of the Convention 
done on December 11, 19 79. 
The head of the High Commission is the High Commissioner 
who is appointed by the Conference of Heads of State and Govern-
ment under Article 11 of the Convention. He is assisted by a 
Secretary General, designated as his deputy. The latter is also 
appointed by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. 
But according to official interpretations of the OMVS, the 
2 2 
Secretary General is "head of Administration", presumably to 
release the attention of the Chief executive towards basic policy 
and operation of the organization. 
20. Le Comite Inter-Etats de la Recherche et du Develcppement 
Agricoles (CIERDA). 
21. Le Comite Consultatif was established by a Council of Ministers 
Resolution on July 11,1976 to comprise the Council of Ministers 
and the Representatives of the Donor Agencies or States con-
tributing to the OMVS projects. Its review functions is to 
facilitate harmonious relations between the OMVS and its source 
of finance. 
22. River Seneral (OMVS 1979) 0£. cit. p. 9. 
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The range of responsibilities of the High Commission as 
the chief executive, are immense. In between sessions of the 
Summit and the Council of Ministers, he is empowered to represent 
the Organization, including consultations with international 
aid institutions as well as other matters of bilateral cooper-
ation in the management of the Senegal basin. Accordingly, he 
may enter into negotiations and sign agreements on financial and 
technical assistance for the construction of "regional infra-
structure (Art. 15).' Similarly, he coordinates financial and 
budgetary matters of the Organization,'as may be directed by the 
Council of Ministers, and as chief executive, he is also respon-
sible for overall efficient personnel and general administration 
of the OMVS (Arts 16 and 17). 
Apart from the Secretary General, there are two other 
principal advisers to the High Commission, the Legal Adviser 
and the Economic and Financial Adviser both of whom are, under 
Article 19 appointed by the Council of Ministers, on recommend-
ation of the Chief executive. The administrative Services 
Department and the Documentation Centre (with its Centre at St. 
Louis) are the support services to the four operational Directo-
rates. The latter which are central to the success of the OMVS 
are: Directorate of Investment; Directorate of Promotion/Develop-
ment of Human Resources; Directorate of Regional Infrastructure; 
Directorate of Development Coordination. It is presumed that 
within its mandate, the High Commissioner may delegate any of 
its powers to these senior officers as might be necessary for 
efficiency. 
Through-its experience, the OMVS found that the member 
states should extend such privileges and immunities to personnel 
of the organizations as may be necessary for performance of 
their functions. Such a special accord was adopted on May 4, 
19 76. Of course, a legitimate question may be raised as to 
the precise limits of such immunities and privileges given that 
the organization is to engage in some activities of direct 
commercial relevance; construction work; deployment of labour 
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force; and ownership of infrastructure. In the ultimate analysis, 
operation of such a legal framework depends on the good faith 
of the contracting states. For instance, the decision by Guinea 
to arrest Oumar Balde, the Secretary General for Planning and 
Economic Development of OERS in March 19 71, was an action by a 
Government which had no commitment to the organization or the 
2 3 mission of its secretariat. 
To conclude this section, here is a quick look at the 
possible functional relations among the principle organs. Where 
an inter-governmental Summit conference is backed by a Council 
of Ministers, it is often the case that the tenure of chairman-
ship for the Summit coincides with that of the Council of Ministers. 
That has been the practice, in OAU, for instance, Therefore, 
the fact that two years is the tenure of the chairmanship of 
OMVS Summit Conference and the Council of Ministers makes the 
coincidence an ideal arrangement. Moreover, given the fact that 
it is actually the Chairman of the Council of Ministers that 
has express responsibilities, the arrangement is, perhaps, to 
be encouraged. Furthermore, if that be the case then there 
must be the unusual two years when the Chairman of the Summit, 
the Council as well as the High Commissioner are from the same 
state. 
But there is a more critical question about the status 
of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General. The latter, 
in fact may have been introduced to help balance the control of 
the Executive Organ by more than one state. Thus, it is perhaps 
no accident that the post was not simply referred to as the 
"Deputy High Commissioner"' along the same lines as in the Niger 
Basin Authority or the Kagera Basin Organization. In which case, 
it seems, the OMVS member states intended the Secretary General 
to be a more operational position and not entirely dependent on 
the functions occasionally delegated by the chief executive. In 
point of fact, we have been above that the OMVS formal practice 
is that the Secretary General is the head of Administration. 
23. See Bornstein, o£. cit. pp. 267, 273. 
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• -Clearly this would guard against the crisis which pre-
vailed' at the Niger Basin Authority from the time Ike Enwemriwa 
was appointed Deputy. Executive Secretary in September 1981, to 
19 84. At the latter stage he walked out in protest because the 
Executive Secretary refused to allocate him responsibility. In [ 
November 19 84 when the Summit dismissed D.M. Traore and appointed: 
a new chief executive to the organization. 
On the other hand, it does not seem that the chief 
executive and his deputy being of different nationalities is, 
ipso facto, a safeguard against abuse of office. During the 
Summit of CEAO at Bamako in October 19 84, the Senegalese, 
Ivorian and a Malian,-all top executives of that organization, i 
were arrested and later convicted for having embezzled the 
equivalent cf US $14 million belonging to CEAO. Indeed we have 
concluded elsewhere that the only safeguard against that is 
protection of the organization against over-politicization as 
well as accent on achievement as a basis of retention of the 
positions. Therefore, the arrangement at the executive office j 
may, nevertheless, provide a framework that permits initiative 
from the structural "deputy" in event that the chief executive j 
goes inert as was in' the Niger Basin Authority. 
The Legal Status of the OMVS Projects 
The projects to be undertaken by the OMVS will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter of this paper. This section is merelyi 
concerned with what the legal instruments of the OMVS say about 
their legal status. For purposes of perspectives, it is suffi-
cient to mention here that the main regional infrastructure which; 
would be considered are two dams: at Diama near the delta of the j 
Senegal and at Manantali in Mali. Besides, there will be the 
24. See details in Okidi, "The Role of the State in the Manage-
ment cf International Rivers and Lakes in Africa" May 19 86 
presented at the Workshop in Management of Rivers and Lake 
Basins in West Africa organized by IDEP/ECA and OMVS June 
26- 1986 especially pp. 18-30. 
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sea-port-.at St. Louis, a river port at Kayes, and ports of call 
at Dagana, Podor, Baghe,- Kaedi, Matam, Bakel and Ambidedi. 
Finally, one would expect that there will be a variety of infra-
structure such as electric power transmission lines, railways 
and roads, where the investment is jointly undertaken. 
In its original form, the OMVS Convention simply provided 
for establishment of infrastructure to facilitate co-operation 25 
development utilizing the resources of the Senegal basin. 
Clearly, the legal status of the infrastructure would have 
implication for the critical question of financial responsib-
ility for their construction. 
Therefore, in 19 74 the Heads of State and Government 
decided certain works or projects' to be declared common works 
(Ouvrage's communs) to be jointly constructed and owned by OMVS 
member states. To that effect the Conference initiated studies 
and drafting work which culminated in adoption of the Conven-
tion relating to the Legal Status of Common Works on December 21, 
1978.26 
The Convention provides modalities by which each of the 
contracting state becomes a co-owner or joint owner, and has 
a right to own shares in the same project - all of the states 
at the same time. Two criteria are to determine whether a 
particular work.is common. First, it may be through a legal 
instrument declaring a particular project be a common work. 
Secondly, such works are materially determined by a list provided 
in Article 3 of the Conve ntion. There are six projects, viz: 
Manantali Dam; Diama Dam; Sea-River port a St. Louis; River Port 
at Kayes; the ports of call and management projects of navig-
able channels; and projects associated, annexed to or in support 
of the above. 
.25. See for instance Articles 1, 8, 14, and 15. 
26. The Convention is discussed in details in Boubacar ojj. cit. 
pp. 26-31. 
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But the rights of the individual states in the common 
projects are individual rights in indivisible shares as well as 
a collective right of use and administration. The OMVS may-
create special administrative agencies, which may be direct 
inter-state public or mixed enterprises, each governed by a 
27 legal instrument relating to the specific project. 
In each case, however, the OMVS retains overall super-
visory powers leaving the management agencies to exercise only 
the powers-delegated to Them. There is danger that the OMVS 
as the parent organization, may inordinately interfere with the 
management of the project. We suggest here that the link with 
this independent but associated management agencies is vital for 
two main reasons: First, it gives OMVS a perpetual overseer 
function in enterprises it has actually created and to ensure 
that they are managed efficiently. Secondly, OMVS will seek 
finances for the projects and should ensure economic returns as 
well as to determine appropriate revenues which might accrue 
therefrom. 
It is suggested, conversely, that this semi-autonomy 
of the enterprises is good for the enterprises themselves. It 
cushions efficiently run enterprises from the inept ones and 
reduces parasitic dependency by the inefficient ones which 
would depend on transfer of subsidies from one agency to another. 
Thus, it offers the inefficient enterprises an opportunity to 
collapse alone or for its subsidization to be reasoned and con-
spicuous. History of parastatal enterprises in Africa is 
littered with disturbing fiascos, ineptitude and unnecessary 
subsidization, all of which are easily hidden in overcentralized 
conglomerates. 
In the case of the common projects of the OMVS it is 
sufficient that technical co-ordination would remain in the 
Council of Ministers and the High Commission as stipulated in 
27. See Articles 15-18 of the 1978 Convention. 
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Article 19 of the 1978 Convention. Recall, for instance, that 
matters such as apportionment of water for various programmes 
is to be overseen by the Permanent Water Commission. It is 
also important that all matters regarding agricultural research 
and development must have the prior support of the Inter-State 
Committee for Agricultural Research and Development (CIERDA), 
which is a committee of the Council of Ministers. The system 
of financing the projects is also centralized in the High Commi-
ssion and the Council of Ministers. 
The Legal Aspects of Funding of Common Projects 
The legal aspects of the funding of the projects is the 
third mechanism compelling a management agency for the project 
to be responsive to the OMVS Council of Ministers and the High 
Commission. In the original convention the question of funding 
was glossed over quickly in form of articulated powers of the 
Council of Ministers and the High Commission. But after the 
adoption of the Convention on Common Projects in December 1978, 
the need for a legal framework for guarantee of loans for such 
projects became apparent and the Council of Ministers adopted 
2 8 
a resolution to that effect on March 27, 19 81. Then it was 
also clear that there should be a formula for sharing of the 
costs of the projects and on May 5, 19 81 the Council of Ministers 29 adopted a resolution to that effect: 
Eventually, the principles in the two resolutions were 
included in a broader Convention Relating to Financial Arrange-
30 
ment for Common Projects/Works, adopted on May 12, 1982. 
Article 2 of the Convention identifies the four sources of funds 
for the OMVS common projects to be: Contributions made by the 
member states; Loans contracted by the states, then ceded back 
28. OMVS Council of Ministers Resolution No.lMl/CM/MN.N of 27 
March 19 81. 
29. OMVS Council of Ministers Resolution NO.14 3/CM/SD of 5 
May 19 81. 
30. This Convention relative aux modalites de finar.cement de 
Ouvrages communs is also discussed in details in Boubacar, 
op• cit. pp. 31-36. 
• - W -
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to the OMVS; Subventions, grants and payments including tech-
nical assistance from external sources; and Loans contracted 
by the organization with or without guarantee. 
As stated earlier, only the Council of Ministers may 
approve contract of loans to the OMVS, even where such nego-
tiations have been conducted by the High Commissioner. However, 
where the financier requires a guarantor, that must be stipu-
lated in the loan agreement. Invariably, the loan will include 
the priicipal sum, interest, and where applicable, commission 
or service charges.^" 
In practice, all the financiers insist on direct member-
state guarantee of the loans rather than block guarantees in 
the name of the OMVS. In fact, only the West German international 
co-operative agency KFW has extended loans directly to the OMVS 
with collective guarantee by the member states. The new OMVS 
formulation under the 19 82 Convention requires the states to 
guarantee the loans in direct proportion to a general formula 
of their benefits from the common projects (Article 8) unless 
the entire loan is specifically designated as guaranteed by a 
specific state. Thus, it is possible for a given guarantor to 
negotiate terms of repayment of a loan, resecheduling or modific-
ation of the original terms so as to ease the service burden's. 
Consequently, where a guarantor becomes delinquent on 
fulfillment of the loan obligations, it is generally presumed 
thai: the particular state suffers the penalties. In actual fact, 
however, some of the financiers have at times solicited pressure 
from other OMVS members by withholding other funds for other 
OMVS projects in event that one member fails in its obligations. 
The official position in OMVS is that, although the 
individual member state guarantees the loan the loan servicing 
is to be done from revenues derived from common projects. In 
31. Both provisions are reflected in Articles 4 and 6 of the 
May 19 8 2 Convention. 
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event that such revenues are either unavailable or insufficient, 
then the member states make the payment with the understanding 
that they receive reimbursement when the revenues become avail-
able. 
The determination of the criteria for cost sharing in 
the construction of the common projects or infrastructure became 
a matter of controversy within the OKVS. Eventually, the Council 
of Ministers adopted a fcrmular worked out by University of Utah, 
which apportioned the costs thus: Malii 36.95% Mauritania: 16.69 
and Senegal: 4 6.36%.°2 This formula, based on a computer model, 
was still a subject of refinement and discussion at the time of 
this research in 1984-85. Whether this formula is based on 
perceived ability of the state to absorb and utilize opportuni-
ties made available by the infrastructure or on the direct 
benefits to be derived from the infrastructure is not clear. But 
a member may request the Council of Ministers to adjust the 
formula, for any specific case; where the Council fails to re-
solve the matter, it will be referred to the Summit, whose deci-
sion must be final and binding. 
Some General Provisions 
The two conventions (or sub-conventions) discussed above 
are self contained but operating within the parent OMVS Conven-
tion whose final clauses are referred to here in brief. Speci-
fically, mention is made of procedure for settlement of disputes, 
amendments, withdrawal and dissolution of the organization. 
Where disputes arise on interpretation or application 
of the Convention recourse may be had to the conciliation and 
mediation procedures. Should that fail, the member states may 
32. Council of Ministers P>esolution No.143/CM/SN/D was adopted 
on May 6,1981. At its 25th Session held in Dakar (Dec.15-18, 
1986) the Council of Ministers decided that the formula will 
be changed to one that takes into account the benefits derived 
by Mauritania from power produced at Manantali. In addition, 
the High Commission was requested to study a possible amend-
ment to the May 19 82 Convention to include implication of re-
troactivity of any modification of the formula. 
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refer the dispute to the formal procedures of the Organization 
of African Unity. But it is provided that as a last resort re-
course may be had to the International Court of Justice, which 
then brings the matter to the organs of the United Nations. 
The latter procedure is made possible by the final article of 
the Convention which requires that the Convention be registered 
with the U.N. Secretary General in accordance with Article 102 
of the U.N. Charter. 
Any member of the OMVS may propose an amendment to the 
Convention, by submitting the written request to the incumbent 
Chairman of the Conference' of Heads of State and Government. 
Should there be a total disagreement and a member decides to 
withdraw it should submit a notice to that effect to the Chair-
man of the Summit, who will determine a date for notification 
to all members. Then the notice is to be effective six months 
from the date of that notice, without prejudice to all prior 
financial and oth'er obligations. It seems that there is an 
ancmally here since the status relating to the Legal Status of 
the Senegal River actually prohibit renunciation in a period 
not less than 99 years. 
The Convention provides, however, that the Organization 
and its Convention may be dissolved upon request of two member 
states. It seems that here the unanimity of decision which is 
required in other matters, is not the rule as it was in the 
OERS. By the majority of votes the Summit may declare the 
organization dissolved and then determine the settlement of 
assets and liabilities of the OMVS. 
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Preliminary Considerations. 
After the overview of the legal and institutional frame-
work of the OMVS, this section will set out a profile of the 
main projects planned for the operation of the organization. 
It should be expected that the projects should properly corres-
pond to the basic objectives of the organization. Moreover, in 
the present case the objectives should relate to the critical 
problem areas of the region. It is well-known, for instance, 
that this being the .Sahel Region, the critical problems relate 
to the general poverty of the population, which is exacerbated 
by scanty rainfall; environmental degradation arising from the 
prevailing desert-like condition; lack of energy resources to 
support industrialization ana social amenities; the limited 
natural resources and the national markets for the enhancement 
of economies of scale; and the limited transportation infra-
3 3 
structure, particularly for the land-locked states. - " Essentially, 
the core of the objectives of the OMVS is to control the flow 
of the waters of the Senegal River, through damming and therefore, 
where appropriate, transform the potential energy created by the 
head, into'hydro-electric power by using it to turn turbines to 
operate generators. In the process, the water at the constructed 
reservoirs may be transferred to other areas of the basin for 
irrigated agriculture. Concurrently, the controlled flow of 
the- river would facilitate navigation of the river to provide 
transportation for the land-locked partner in the organization. 
To date, the' development infrastructure for the OMVS have 
been identified as follows: 
(1) The construction of the Manantali regulation and hydro-
electric dam; 
(2) The construction of the Diama anti-salt and irrigation dam; 
(3) The development of the river for perennial navigation on 
the 950 km stretch between St. Louis at the mouth, and Kayes 
in Mali-; - - . 
33. See the four general but lofty objectives of the organization 
in River Senegal (OMVS, >06$ > p.l. 
34. ibid. 
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(4) The construction of the river port in St. Louis, of a ter-
minal river port in Kayes and of ten places of call along 
the river. 
These are the infrastructures to achieve given develop-
ment programmes. Thus, the development programmes under the 
OMVS may be discussed under the following broad headings:" 
(A) Irrigated agriculture 
.(B) Hydro-electric power 
(C) Navigation 
(D) Others, to include forestry, fisheries and stock-breeding. 
Irrigated Agriculture 
Hydro-agricultural programmes under the OMVS is to depend 
on regulated flow of the Senegal and based on the basin-wide 
control of the river. This is to be distinctly different from 
the pre-OMVS practice. 
The history of irrigated agriculture in the Senegal basin 
3 5 
is beyond the scope of this paper, concerned as it is only with 
the programmes planned under the OMVS. It is sufficient to point 
out, though, that the past practice has been a combination based 
on flood recession and limited embarkment. With these practices 
it was found that the maximum area which could be irrigated was 
28,805 hectares, of which 23,230 hectares were in Senegal, 5,305 3 6 
hectares in Mauritania, and 270 hectares in Mali. With the . I 
planned control of the flow of the river the area to be under 
irrigation is expected to increase significantly. 
River flow regulation is to be realized by the construc- , 
tion of two dams. Manantali Dam, to be constructed on the 
Bafing, one of the tributaries of the Senegal, is located in Mali.! 
35. For a brief and concise account see OMVS, Social Economic 
Study on the Senegal River Basin: General Report. Part C. 
Introduction of Irrigated Agriculture m the Senegal River 
Basin• (OMVS. High Commission, Planning and Co-ordination 
Directorate April, 1980). 
36. Platon, "The Development of the Senegal River" in Marches 
Tropicaux et Mediterraneens (No 1349, 17 April 1981) p.15 
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With a maximum height above the foundations, the dam is expected 
to store a volume of 11 billion cubic metres of water. During 
the transition phase it is expected to release 200 cubic metres 
per second artificial flood for one month in August/September. 
The latter arrangement is designed to maintain the traditional 
flood crops, pending generalization of irrigated agriculture 
37 throughout the basin. 
On its own, the Manantali is expected to facilitate irrig-
ation of 255,000 hectares of land in the basin. 
Diama' dam, is being built near St. Louis, at the mouth 
of the Senegal. Better known as an anti-salt dam, the Diama 
is basically conceived to prevent salty sea water from intrusion 
upstream. During the low rains period upstream, and therefore 
low river current, the sea water pushes its way up the Senegal, 
sometimes as far as 300 kilometres upstream from St. Louis. 
Naturally-, the 'salinity of the water would prevent a number of 
beneficial uses of the river, notably, irrigation and domestic 
uses of the Senegal river waters. 
A number of people have observed that the dam was in 
fact unnecessary if salt water intrusion was its purpose because 
by controlling the flow the Manantali would control the draught 
at the mouth of the river and therefore prevent the salt water 
intrusion upstream. Thus, with a tinge of cynicism, the 
observers argue that the Diama was calculated to satisfy the 
political ego of the Senegalese polity where, they argue, the 
" perception that Mali-and not Senegal-would have a dam was un-
acceptable. The- conciusion, therefore"Was that the construction 
3 8 of the Diama was for political prestige only. 
37. More particulars of the dam are given in River Senegal 
(OMVS 1985) op. cit. p. 2. Obviously they mean very 
little to a non-Engineer. 
38. These viev?s obtained in personal interview in Dakar are 
elaborated in Okidi "The Role of the State in the Manage-
ment of Rivers and Lakes in Africa" op. cit. especially 
pp. 22-24. 
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But the position is dismissed by the plan that the Diama 
alone will actually facilitate irrigation of some 42,000 hectares. 
Moreover, the combined action of the two dams would facilitate 
the irrigation of an additional 7 8,000 hectares, or an increase 
of a 26 percent over the total of what the two dams contribute 
separately. 
Therefore, the two dams are, in fact, complementary, a 
fact which was symbolized by the presence of Presidents Senghor 
of Senegal, Traore of Mali and Haidalla of Mauritania at the 
laying of foundation stone for the Diama on December 12, 19 79. 
The combined action of both dams brings the total irrigable area 
of the basin to 375,000 hectares of which 240,000 hectares in 
Senegal, 126,000 hectares in Mauritania and 9,000 hectares in 
Mali.39 
The scope of actual irrigation realizable will be assessed 
with time. As of July 1982 only a total of 32,000 hectares was 
developed and under cultivation, of which 26,000 hectares were 
on Senegalese bank, 5,500 hectares on Mauritania bank and 350 
hectares in Mali. Yet it is estimated that for them to realize 
cereal self-sufficiency Senegal and Mauritania would have to 
develop 180,000 hectares and 71,000 hectares by the year 1990 
and 248,000 hectares and 94,000 hectares by the year 2000 res-
-, 40 pectively. 
39. See CMVS, Indicative Programme for Hydroagricultural Develop-
ment (1981-1990) and Progress of Agricultural Development 
Projects (Dakar, OMVS High Commission, Development and Coor-
dination Directorate. September 19 83) p. 4. 
40. Diop, "Objectives of and Orientation for the Regional 
Integrated Development of the Senegal Basin" (OMVS, Dakar, 
June 19 86) p.5. 
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A great deal still remain to be determined in the condi-
tions for complete irrigation of this area of the basin. Gene:-
•41 
rally, it is assumed that technical feasibility is sound, which 
leaves a greater degree of uncertainty in the development of the 
competent institutional capability and efficiency. But depending 
on those, assumptions the irrigation of the 375,000 hectares would 
be completed in anything from 30 years to 76 years. 
Past observation have held that the most serious bottle-
neck to the intensified irrigation in the Senegal basin is the 
institutions for the management of the farmers' programmes. 
Each of the three basin states has had its own parastatal body 
managing irrigation. In Senegal it is the Societe d'Amenagement 
et d'Exploitation du Delta (SAED) or the Delta Development and 
Exploitation Corporation; the Malian counterpart is Operation 
Vallee du Senegal, Terekole, Magui (0.V.S.T.M.); and in Mauritania 
the body is called Societe Nationale de Developpement Rural 
(S0NADER). 
In their respective instances these institutions have 
formulated and enforced policies on irrigation in the Senegal 
basin. The farms have been in three different categories, 
better known as parameters: Small parameters, medium parameters 
and large parameters. In each case, the institutions have 
determined the farming methods including the appropriate farm 
inputs. But the experience between the institutions and the 
farmers has been less than satisfactory. In its efforts to re-
align the system, the OMVS initiated socio-economic studies 
which concluded that with the slight exception of S0NADER, the 
institutions had been inefficient and ineffective in dealing 
4 ? with the farmers. The study found that the 0VSTM had been 
41. Some of the critical questions in the institutional capacity 
are outlined below and in the final section of this paper. 
For general observation see Okidi "The Role of the State in 
the Management of River and Lake Basins in Africa" oj>. cit. 
and Adrian Adams, "The Senegal River Valley: What Kind of 
Change?" in Review of African Political Economy Humber 10, 
September-December 1977, pp. 33-59. 
42. OMVS, Introduction of Irrigated Agriculture in the Senegal 
River fiasin (1580) p. C.VlVS. 
I 
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rather authoritarian and farmers were urging for the system 
to move self-supervision, but the worst case was SAED where 
in the first place, the extension workers were, generally, 
aliens in the local farming milieu. It adds that the extension 
workers sometimes had antagonistic and authoritarian image. 
While they had been relatively efficient on large irrigation 
schemes, the results were.poor in the small schemes. Further-
more, OVSTM was found to be particularly deficient on trained 
manpower and. management capabilities. 
The faults of the institutions may be summarized as 
follows: They were over-centralized, to the extent that they 
lost functional contact with the farmers. Perhaps as a result 
of the distance, the agents of the institutions became insensi-
tive to the needs and wishes of the farmers. Consequently, they 
were unable to transmit the research findings or general tech-
nology to the farmers for the improvement of productivity of 
irrigated agriculture. 
The Council of Ministers has reviewed this record, and 
accepted the study. Consequently, the Council has adopted new 
general principles to guide a hew approach for irrigated agri-
culture under OMVS schemes. Its principal components include: 
11 continuous planning and evaluating of the perimetres at the 
sub-regional and national level; measures co lighten the workload 
of the development institutions and to decentralize them; insti-
tution and economic measures in order to reactivate the develop- : 
ment agencies and organisms; and continuation of research work 
on the most fundamental aspects which affect the introduction 
43 
of irrigated crops in the sub-region. Within that context con-
siderable emphasis is placed oh restructuring the agencies and 
enhancing their sensitivity towards reduction of costs and 
43. OMVS, Indicative Programme for the Senegal River Basin Hydro-
agricultural Development (1981-1990; ano Progress of Agricul-
tural Development Projects. (High Commission, Development 
and Coordination Directorate, Dakar, September 1983) p. 18. 
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financial charges as well as "decentralization of the tasks at 
farmers' level and progressive increase of the farmers' respons-
ibilities in the management of their perxmetres". 
The Indicative Programme prepared in 19 83 has urged the 
agencies to sustain efforts which recently yielded encouraging 
results. For instance, 1982/83 season, SAED rainfed paddy 
production reached 50,000 tons from 12,000 hectares or an 
average of 4.5 tons per hectares. SONADER's performance during 
the same period, from 2,500 hectares was 10,000 tons of paddy, 
4 5 
or 4 tons per hectare. Beside the paddy rice, other major 
crops expected to be grown in the valley are sugar, wheat, 
sorghum, corn and vegetables. 
Hydro-electric power 
Given the physical setting of the Senegal River, the 
dam sites which have power production potential are in Guinea 
and Mali. It has been estimated that the total production 
potential amounts to 4,733 million KWh, of which 3,384 KWh 
could be produced in Mali alone, at the following sites: Mananta 
600 million KWh. Galongo 1,5 20 million KWh; Gourbassi 104 milli 
KWh; Small Goiana 560 million KWh; and Felou 400 million KWh.46 
There are already small power plants built at Galongo and Felou 
both of which are slightly upstream from Kayes and both supply 
some of that city's electricity needs. 
47 
Gourbassi which, is on the Feleme, is located about 240 
kilometres upstream from Bekel. Its retention capacity is about 
1.5 billion cubic metres of water and, thus, could add 100 cubic 
metres per second to a regularized flow of the river. Its in-
stalled capacity of power is 20 megawatts, which gives the guara 
teed power production of 104 GWh. 
44. ibid p. 19. 45. ibid pp. 19-
45. OMVS, The River Senegal. (Dakar, 1979) p. 16. 
V 7. Marches Tropicaux op. cit. p. 8. 
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The preinvestment studies found, however, that the maxi-
mum yield on these dams depend on the construction of the dam 
at Manantali which will give the regulating effect. As stated 
earlier, the site at Manantali has a storage capacity of upto 
11 billion cubic metres of water. The planned installed capacity 
of power is 200 megawatts which is capable of the guaranteed 
48 annual production of 800 giga-watthours, although the actual 
production capacity per year is 1,000 giga-watt hours, from the 
49 
dam whose net head will be 46 metres. It is expected that the 
artificial lake created by the dam will cover an area approximate! 
50,000 hectares whose consequence'will be displacement of about 
12,000 people. In order to avoid pollution, complete deforest-
ation has had to be undertaken in the area to be inundated 
before the reservoir is filled. 
Electricity produced at the dam is expected to have major 
industrial impact on the contracting states, and the states must, 
indeed, consider industrial use of the power since domestic power 
consumption alone would not be a viable option for that magnitude 
of power production. in the OMVS plans the leading consumer of 
the electricity is to be the mining industry including iron, 
bauxite and phosphates. In Senegal, the Kanieba and other 
reserves in the Feleme region is estimated at 600 million tons, 
with a content of 60-68 percent of iron oxide have been'identifie: 
Between Kayes and Kalikouro in Mali, there is an iron deposit 
exceeding 2 billion tons out of which 500 billion is easily ex-
ploitable ana is good quality ore, concentrated within the Senega" 
basin. Besides, Mali has identified approximately 800 million 
tons cf easily exploitable bauxite deposites with aluminium con-
tent, estimated to exceed 40 percent. Furthermore, in Mauritania 
exploratory surveys have indicated deposits of over 4 million 
tons of phosphates, over 4 million tons with a tricalcic phosphat 
5 2 content between 50 and 70 percent at Cive, near Kaedi. It as 
4 8. ibid. Note that it will be equipped with five 40 megawatt 
generators each of which yields the 200 MW. 
49. OMVS. The River Senegal (Dakar, 1985) p. 7. 
50. ibid• p.2. 51. See Marches Tropicaux op. cit. p.8. 
52. OMVS, River Senegal (Dakar, 1979) op. cit. p. 16 
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imperative that both the construction of the power lines and 
the mining operations should be in place by the time the dam 
fills. 
The construction of the dam commenced in September 19 81. 
As of the end of January 19 85 the work was already more than 
50 percent completed with the filling of the reservoir scheduled 
for August 19 87. With that, one of the first most expensive 
commonly owned project or regional infrastructure in A.frica, 
will have been constructed. This paves the way for other 
infrastructure, notably, navigation infrastructure, irrigation 
infrastructure and power transmission infrastructure. 
The foregoing arrangements, for the possible users of 
the power, need to be constructed immediately given the original 
caveats that supply may be far in excess of the possible demand 
for electricity in the region. One commentator notes: 
"In view of the high cost of installing and maintaining 
power lines and transportation losses of 13 to 14%, a 
distance of 300 km may be the limit for competitive-
ness for hydro-electric power in an African context 
though most experts think that supplying the two cities 
(Kayes and Bamako) .. with electricity can be profit-
able. Nevertheless, even by 1990 .. their demand will 
be no greater than 350 GWh, equivalent to about 44% 
5 3 of the Manantali project's total production". 
In fact, given the scenario where the two cities alone 
consume 44 per cent, the power may all be easily consumed, with 
extra demand unsatisfied if the mining operations were to be 
commenced. Moreover, it is already established that both, the 
Government of Senegal and Mauritania are keen to construct 
transmission lines to their respective capitals, with Mauritania 
particularly determined to use the power for mining of phosphates 
in Kaedi. 
53. Marches Tropicaux, op. cit. p. 8. 
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But here may also be a major test for the concept of 
common infrastructure. Senegal already has good indications 
that it would obtain finances to construct a transmission line, 
unilaterally and taking the shortest and most direct line from 
Manantali to Dakar. Mauritania for its part prefers that they 
both construct a common transmission line along the valley up 
to a location close to Kaedi or St. Louis, whence, separate 
national lines to the mining locations or national capitals 
respectively. The main.reason is that Mauritania has not 
obtained the requisite finances, and in any case, she would find 
it more economical if they so jointly shared the cost of the 
infrastructure. Whatever is the resolution to the differences, 
the demand for the electricity produced at Manantali seems 
established and there may in fact be a need to construct the 
other potential sites as well. 
River Navigation 
To date, the land-locked Mali had to depend on favour-
able relations with Ivory Coast and Senegal to facilitate its 
international trade by overland railroad transportation. This 
is not only a precarious arrangement given the potential politi-
cal conflicts in the region, as has been recently witnessed 
between Burkina Paso and Mali, but it is also expensive. Thus, 
Senegal River navigation is a particularly attractive option for 
Mali, and that can be facilitated by regulation of the river 
flow by the Manantali Gam. ; 
It has been determined that with a flow rate not less 
! 
than 100 metres per second at Bakel, a permanent navigation 
between St. Louis and Kayes, a distance of 950 kilometres is 
guaranteed. But in fact, the design of the dam is such as to 
maintain the flow rate at 300 cubic metres per second, at Bakel, 
so as to fulfill irrigation target of 375,000 hectares, as well 
as to ensure the power generation at the required level. 
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The flow requirements for the navigation of the river 
are therefore amply protected. For efficient navigation it 
will be necessary to clear the silts as well as to construct 
ports of call as supplements to the main terminal ports at St. 
Louis and Kayes. Besides, the optimal flow rate will permit the 
use of vessels of increasing capacity, in order to realize in-
creasingly reduced kilometre-ton unit costs and therefore, ensure 
economical transport costs. 
Apart from the sea-link for Mali, the river navigation 
would also open up development opportunities for the resources 
of the region particularly in agriculture and mining. This 
would provide an additional linkage in integrated regional 
development of the basin and the contracting states. 
To facilitate the sea-river approach, a navigation lock 
of 13x175 meter will be built alongside the left bank of the 
Diama dam. But arrangements for a second lock with larger dimen-
sions 'is possible, should the needs expand. 
Other Resource Sectors 
Regulation of the flow of the Senegal, especially the 
very dam construction, opens up an opportunity for development 
in a number of resource sectors, notably fisheries, forestry 
and livestock productions. 
Fisheries: The present flow regime of the Senegal offers signi-
ficant fishing opportunities for the inhabitants. But accord-
ing to the Development Coordination and Evaluation Directorate, 
the dams and consequent regulation of the flow, is expected to 
significantly change the ecology of the river and lead to a fall 
in the fish catch by approximately 13,000 tons per year from the 
54 normal catch average, of 40,000-50,000 tons per year. 
54. For these see OMVS, River .Senegal (Dakar, 1979 ) o£. cit. 
p. 20. 
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The plan, however, is to compensate for that reduction 
by concerted effort in inland pisciculture activities in the 
river itself, in the Manantali reservoir, and in other lakes 
such as Guiers and R'kiz. Within that context, the OMVS has 
planned the following four components in their activities: 
"- An extension of experimental pisciculture activities 
in irrigated parameters; 
- establishment of research-development services with, in 
particular, a network of demonstration basins covering 
the Entire Senegal river basin; 
- strengthening of the cooperative structure through a 
training programme for fishermen's organizations and 
of support by relevant financial institutions which 
would facilitate access to credit for the development 
of fishing or conservation equipment; 
- support to marketing with the opening up of lines of 
credit to traders in order to improve their transport 
and storage capacities". 
Thus, the fishing activities anticipated under the OMVS prog-
rammes is not confined to the Manantali dam which, it will be 
recalled, covers approximately 50,000 hectares. But this is 
nevertheless, expected to play a major role. It is also expected 
that in organizing the fishermen's cooperatives and the credit 
schemes, some priority would be placed on the 12,000 people dis-
placed by the dam and whom, in any case, will have been settled 
elsewhere. In any event, the fish is expected to contribute to 
the nutritional needs of the region, as a development goal. 
Forestry: One of the characteristics of the Sahel zone is the 
absence of trees and general vegetation cover, which in turn 
exposes the soil to the vagaries of weather and thus, cause.fur-
ther deterioration. Besides, forestry is required for fuel wood 
as well as for building purposes. To date, these uses of wood 
as well as severe drought have destroyed old forests. 
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The OMVS programme intends to undertake afforestation 
as' a measure in environmental restoration and the focus is on 
sensitization to such needs. Where possible, greater emphasis 
will be placed on encouraging agro-forestry. 
Various zones of the basin have been surveyed for their r c 
potentials. The upper basin, bordering Guinea and Mali and 
within Mali, offer the highest forestry potentials with "wood 
parks" (a bush or forest type savannah), which could produce 
several cubic metres of wood per year. The valley and the 
delta zones have forest potentials consisting mainly of firewood 
and Gonakie fruits, as well as bark for tanning. Even though 
about 30,000 hectares of the areas with Gonakie would be enun-
dated by the dams, the remaining area could actually yield 300,000 
cubic metres of firewood per year, given proper husbandry. A 
further 20,000 hectares could be replanted with Gonakie trees 
and produce 200,000 cubic metres of wood per year. At any rate, 
it has been seen that in all, the total area of the basin suit-
5 7 able for intensive forestry activities is 60,000 hectares. 
Livestock: Stock raising is frequently combined with agricul-
ture and in the pre-construction situation there were upto 1.2 
million sedentary and nomadic cattle (about equivalent to the 
human population) in the basin, but in initial stages of the 
post-construction the stock keeping will not be encouraged by 
the OMVS irrigation programme because the watering will be 
hindered by the dikes and food supply reduced. The OMVS studies 
point out that with the operation towards the 375,000 hectares 
irrigation a number of advantages conducive to stock rearing will 
develop. For instance, the processing of sugar and cereals will 
yield by-products used as feeds; crop rotation will facilitate 
production of abundant forage crops; and the filling of natural 
depressions such as Aftout-es-Sahel, Lake R'Kiz and Lake Guiers 
will have positive impact on neighbouring pastures. With the en-
couragement of stock rearing, there would be development opportu-
nities for the establishment of beef or leather industry. Besides 
56. Marches Tropicaux, op. cit. p. 28-29. 
57. ibid 
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the existence of livestock also opens an avenue for use of 
animal manure in agriculture, which would be cheaper than the 
artificial fertilizers. 
Some Questions of Strategy and Logistics 
The OMVS has experienced several logistical problems 
during the organization's short but intensive operation. In 
this sub-section it will be sufficient to mention only three 
illustrative instances, with brief explanations of the nature 
of the problems. 
Contract and Sub-contracts 
The contract for the construction of the Manantali dam 
had been granted to a group of firms from West Germany, while 
a group of French firms were assigned the construction of the 
Diama dam. In fact, the consulting engineers also came from 
the same countries, for the respective dams. Thus, the top 
level of the construction work was given to the foreign firms, 
with all the financial implications. 
At the 15th Meeting of the Consultative Committee it was 
reported that: "Concern was expressed at the highest level-of 
OMVS at the fact that the volume of work sub-contracted to the 
economic operators of the OMVS member states did not exceed 2% 
of the amount of the Diama and Manantali contracts. Even cont-
racts of minimum value are entrusted to foreign firms whereas 
5 8 
the work could be well carried out by local enterprises" . . 
Presumably, the OMVS bemoaned the practice for two main reasons. 
First, if the contractors, earning the bulk of the cost of const-
ruction belong to a foreign firm and so too are the sub-cont^. 
ractors, then the money for the construction benefits the foreign 
country and not the recipient country, except via the dam built. 
This may have repugnant implications. Secondly, the local firms 
would be presumed to obtain a sub-contract on the basis of compe-
tence. But at the same time the sub-contract would enable a 
local company to gain experience in the major works, thus, promote 
the strengthening of local institutions for future works. 
58. OMVS High Commission, "15th Meeting of the Consultative 
Committee: Diama and Manantali Progress Report: Introductory 
Note" (Dakar, October 1983) p.3. Hereinafter, "15th Consult-
• • J v — i — N o t e " . 
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It was found, however, that even though several co-
financiers actually accepted the preference that sub-contracts 
go to the local rather than foreign firms, such a provision was 
not included in the tender dossiers and therefore not taken 
into account. They agreed that member state economic operators 
should be favoured in the consideration of the sub-contracts. 
It was .also found that the Consulting Engineer who should 
protect the interests of the OMVS - the owner, actually habi-
tually endorsed the proposals of the contractors. This mistake 
may have arisen from in the choice of a consulting engineer 
who is fundamentally "closer" to the contractor than to the 
owner. Finally, the Consultative Committee recommended that 
the consultant would consult the OMVS before giving approval to 
any sub-contract proposed by the contractors. 
Worker benefits and Industrial Questions 
A number of incidents relating to the living conditions 
of the workers, as well as balanced deployment from the cont-
racting states, emerged during the construction stage. The 
location of the construction work is, by definition, not a 
settled area even if it had been settled before. Therefore, 
proper accommodation for the worker's must be provided at the 
site. Moreover, it is understood that because the dam const-
ruction is a common work the contracting states should be 
equitably represented Un the labour force thus, adding to the 
necessity for a workers' camp at the site for those from the 
various states. 
Yet at the beginning of the construction of Diarca dam 
the General Administrative Agreement was not explicit on who 
would be responsible for the construction of accommodation for 
the labourers. The Owner (OMVS) had assumed that the Contractor 
was responsible while the latter believed the reverse, maintain-
ing that he was responsible only for the senior staff and fore-
men . 
Dissatisfied with their living conditions, the labourers 
staged a strike during September and October 19 82. A.nd on Sept-
ember 19, they held a demonstration as they saw a Council of 
Ministers delegation visit the site. 
111 
- 46 - IDS/DP 283 
Negotiations involving the interpretation of the Senega-
lese labour and urban law which were applicable to the contract 
did not resolve the problem before it was referred by the Con-
tractor to the International Chamber of Commerce as was provided 
for in the General Administrative Agreement. Aftei' about three 
years of intense negotiations the matter was, however, settled 
out of court when the contructor accepted his obligations. 
In the case of the Manantali, it was the Malian labour 
laws that applied. Tnus, when in December 19 83 the Contractor 
dismissed 250 Malian workers in order to allow for recruitment 
of workers from Mauritania and Senegal, he was required to nego-
tiate with Malian labour officials to ensure that the relevant 
regulations on termination of service were adhered to. 
Land Tenure Questions. 
The land tenure questions in the areas of potential 
irrigation in the Senegal basin are too complex and broad for 
59 
this paper. It is sufficient to point out that m many 
respects, the actual tenure is inextricably tied to productivity 
since many farmers will see the nature of ownership and duration 
as providing incentive to work hard. Those who may be engaged 
only on temporary basis may be pre-occupied with the question 
of security for themselves and their descendants. 
In the Senegal Valley the system for appropriation and 
exploitation of land is an integral part of the region's agro-
pastoral system which has become destabilized by the combined 
effect of drought, emigration and depletion of resources. Besides 
the very introduction of large scale irrigation will perforce 
change the nature of settlement in the valley if the farmers are 
to transform their lifestyles and engage in intensive and commer-
cialized agriculture. 
59. For a reasonable discussion of the question of land rights 
and social relationship in the valley, see OMVS, Introduc-
tion of Irrigated Agriculture in the Senegal River Basin, 
0£. cit. pp. C.VIII. 1-33 and Diop c£. cit. pp. 27-36. 
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V: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROJECTS 
Drastic transformation of the natural environment within 
the Senegal drainage basin is at the core of the objectives of 
the OMVS. Primarily, the organization seeks to control the 
flow of the Senegal river to facilitate, among other things, 
the transfer of its water to the arid and desert-like lands and 
to render such lands productive. Besides, the organization 
seeks to create new hydro-electric power opportunities in order 
to activate new economic opportunities and, hopefully, to ease 
pressure on some of the existing energy resources. Thus, environ-
mental implication of the projects is obviously expected. 
With the foregoing postulates in mind, the questions for 
this Section of the paper are as follows: (1) What are the 
salient environmental consequences which will arise from the 
projects? (2) Did the constituent instruments of the OMVS anti-
cipate the adverse aspect of the changes? (3) If it did, what 
are the provisions for legal and institutional arrangements, in 
those constituent instruments for ameliorating such changes? Are 
there any desirable legal and institutional provisions which 
should have been included in the constituent instruments? 
The Range of Environmental Consequences 
It is suggested above, that the environmental conse-
quences of the OMVS projects would be either positive or negative. 
For purposes of-this discussion, it is efficient to give first, 
a synoptic profile of the positive impacts. 
The first positive impact, which is intended, is a res-
ponse to the poor and deteriorating condition of the land with-
in the basin. The whole area is popularly known as Sahelian 
Africa, which is now a self-explanatory concept but the depletion 
of ^he vegetation cover has worsened in the past decade arid a 
half as the decreasing vegetation has in turn led to the over-
grajing by livestock and destruction of forests by man for fuel 
• woo<J. Other climatic trends 'especially from early 19 70's have 
Korseped the trend, which in turn, impoverishes the soil and 
diminishing agricultural opportunities. 
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As pointed out in the projects section, it is expected 
that the flow control should ultimately facilitate irrigation 
of 375,000 hectares in the basin. The plan is that proper 
management should bring 255,000 hectares under irrigation by 
the year .202 8 and thereafter save the land from further deserti-
fication.60 This is a drastic, agro-ecological change which 
would be expected to change settlement in the region. Besides, 
the agricultural activities would create new food production 
opportunities and therefore meet the nutritional needs of the 
people. 
If we accept that malnutrition is a fundamental environ-
mental problem (or a serious consequence of environmental de-
gradation) then we should note that the OMVS studies6"1' point 
out that the gross production from the planned agriculture by 
the year 2000 will result in a surplus of 112,870,000,000 calo-
ries with a possibility of the residents getting the minimum 
requirement of 2,300 calories per person per day. In terms of 
proteins production the basin developments should yield 35,940, 
000,000 grams per year by the year 2000. It is estimated though 
that if the-rate of population increase is 2.3 per annum then 
there might be a deficit of 608,360,000,000 calories per year, 
which would reduce the daily average to 2034 calories per 
capita. In that case, the protein requirement will still be 
met, but the surplus would drop to about '21,240,000,000 grams 
per year. It is to be noted that the protein production would 
be expected from agriculture, livestock and fisheries. 
Fodder production opportunities are expected to improve 
and stabilize the livestock production. In general terms, it 
6 2 
is expected that approximately 14 percent of the land scheduled 
for irrigation, as above, will in fact be set aside for fodder 
production. Thus, with the proper management and paying atten-
tion to the carrying capacity the land should maintain the live-
stock production without dangers of overgrazing. 
60. OMVS, Assessment of Environmental Effects of the Proposed 
Developments in the Senegal river Basin: Synthesis. Final 
Report done by Gannet Flemming Corddry and Carpenter, Inc. 
Harrisburg, Pa, USA in association with 0RGATEC Societe 
Africaine d'Etudes Techniques, Dakar, Senegal, undated. 
(OMVS, Dakar) p. 173. 
61. ibid p. 189. 
62. TbTci p. 174. 
- 49 - IDS/DP 2 83 
Forestry is also expected to expand within the basin. 
The OMVS estimates that the Upper Basin offers the highest 
forestry potentials, possibly several million cubic metres of 
6 3 
wood per year , provided there is sound management practices. 
The study adds that although about 50 percent of the land area 
in the middle basin will be inundated as a result of the flow 
regulation, the other half, estimated at 30,000 hectares will 
yield equivalent of 300,000 cubic metres of firewood annually.65 
Diversified silvicultural practices could yield much more than 
this. 
It is expected that the irrigated parameters should simply 
provide the nucleus for reforestration, with new forests possibly 
placed around or in the vicinity of the irrigated areas. Heed-
less to say, forests have many functions of which timber for 
building and fuelwood are only two. Forests have the prominent 
environmental role in catchment conservation and as windbreak 
that inhibit soil erosion. 
The OMVS also expects, as "fortunate symbiosis" in its 
development work where the forage crops is grown for the live-
stock, that the latter would not only produce manure to be used 
in production of staple foods but also to ease the demand for 
chemical fertilizers. Plantation of forage crops can also be 
alternated withthe staple crops in order to maintain soil ferti-
lity. The plans are that the forage production would average 
66 
100 to 150 tons per hectare. Moreover, the needs could be 
balanced with those for afforestation and other competing uses of 
irrigated land: 
Water for domestic and industrial consumption would also 
be increased by the dams, especially since the intrusion of 
salinity from the sea would be halted by Diama impoundment. 
Additional storage of the clean water would be enhanced by the 
recharge of Lac de Guiers, Lac R'Kiz and the Aftout es Sahel. 
63. OMVS, River Senegal (Dakar, OMVS, 1979) p. 16. 
64. ibid. 
65. Marches Tropicaux, op. cit. p.16 where the notion of "fortur 
nate symbiosis" is used. Additionally, see OMVS, Social ar.d 
economic Study of the Senegal River Basin. E.IV. cp~I cit. pp. 
9-10. 
66J OMVS, The River Senegal (Dakar, 1985). Note, however, that 
Marches Trcpicaux op.cTt. gives the estimate of population 
as 9-10 ,000 people. 
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The energy options will be aeversified by hydro-electric 
power from Manantali. The possible negative environmental 
impacts of this power, compared to hydro-carbons, for instance, 
is much lower. Ana if it is priced reasonably, it may ease the 
pressure on fuel wood and therefore assist the conservation of 
vegetation cover. 
In all, the positive environmental impacts of the OMVS 
projects are vast enough to have justified the investments. 
The negative impacts are diverse: Some are rather 
obvious while others are subtle, and might even be debatable, 
with highly technical interpretations. Therefore, for purpose 
of this paper broad problems are highlighted under the following 
categories: (a) Land and Settlement; (b) Wildlife Displacement; 
Cc) Public Health; (d) Coastal Erosion and Sedimentation; (e) 
Municipal and Industrial Pollution (including transportation). 
Land and Settlement 
By its definition, dam construction on a river entails 
backwater and inundation, of land area upstream. The Manantali 
dam is expected to cover a total area of approximately 50,000 
hectares, settled in about 15 villages with a total population 
6 7 
estimated at 12,000 . The resettlement, already to be under-
written by the USAID, may be seen by some as a problem only over-
weighed by the fact that the new environment be the more economi-
cally productive. It is reported that to mitigate the possible 
adverse public health in the new settlement areas, two public 
health operations accompany the resettlement plans. 
There will also be inundation of the land between St. 
Louis and Kayes where enough water is expected to facilitate 
navigation over the 950 kilometres distance. Approximately, 
5,000 hectares of land, previously used for flood recession agri-
6 8 
culture along the banks, will be permanently lost to inundation. 
And more, by the year 202 8 when most of the presently planned 
projects are to be accomplished, it is expected that a total of 6 9 
359,000 hectares are expected to be lost in the Middle Valley. 
With that will also be loss of biomass of plants and related fauna. 
67. OMVS, Assessment of Environmental Effects, op. cit. p. 72. 
UB. ibijg• p.l^V; t>H. lfcic p. 179. " 
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Wildlife Displacement 
The inundation of the land of the magnitude outlined 
above often entails large scale displacement of wildlife ordi-
70 
narily inhabiting the areas. Studies confirm that most of 
the wildlife in the Senegal River Belt region have been deci-
mated over the past two centuries, largely through the dest-
ruction of the habitats by man and his livestock. That has 
affected the larger animals such as gazelles, antelopes and 
monkeys, all of which have almost disappeared from the area. 
Smaller animals such as jackals, rodents and cats have scarcely 
managed to adapt to the meagre pre-project conditions. 
The inundation caused by the Diama dam is expected to 
lead to loss of terrestrial habitats, even though with a gain in 
the acquatic habitats. The total actual terrestrial habitat 
to be lost in the Diama zone is approximately 130-310 square 
kilometres hitherto designated as a habitat for terrestrial 
species such as warthogs, jackals, rodents and small carnivores 
71 
- such as gervals, civettes and genets. On the other hand, 
the main beneficiaries from the additional acquatic habitats 
are the Nile Crocodiles and the Senegal River Mantees". Of these 
animals, the fate of the mantees has raised international con-
cern and studies about it is still under way. 
The Manantali impoundment will affect 42,900 hectares of 
terrestrial habitats, which has been the home for small game 
ungulates such as crin, bushback and red-flanked duikers. Others 
which may be affected include roan antelopes, water-bucks and 
bohor reedbucks. The impact statements assert firmly that "most 
of the animals displaced by the waters of the Manantali reservoir 
22 have only a small chance of survival in the surrounding habitat... 
Fish species are also expected to be affected by the ccn-
73 
struction works. The impact studies estimate that the estuarme 
species which are dependent on salinity could decrease with the 
harvest falling by as much as 4,000 metric tons in the Lower Delta 
and 7,500 metric tons in -he Upper Delta. The annual fresh water 
harvest projected upstream is only 4,500 metric tones, leaving a 
net loss approximated at 7,000 metric tons. 
70. ibid p. 179; 71. ibid p. 159; 72. ibid p. 181; 
73. ibid. 
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Public Health Aspects 
As pointed out already, several public health indicators 
will be improved by the projects of the OMVS as nutrition is 
improved and available public water supply enhances sanitation 
among the inhabitants. That notwithstanding a number of public 
health problems associated with disease vectors which thrive in 
74 stagnant waters will inevitably increase. 
It is not possible to quantify the diseases that might 
arise from the - constructions with any accuracy. But itis expected 
that the vector mosquitoes will increase and consequently, 
malaria transmission, especially around the irrigation parameters 
where year-round water stagnation will be a requirement. 
Similarly, schistosomiasis infection will also increase 
with the abundance of favourable breeding conditions in the 
Manantali and Middle Valley areas. Onchocerciasis, already a 
menace in the region will also become a serious health threat. 
Finally, there is likely to be high prevalence of endemic 
goitre in the upper basin caused by iodine deficiency. But the 
impact studies point out that all the foregoing diseases are 
controllable and do not pose serious health problems to the in-
habitants if health care,programmes and health education are 
instituted by appropriate public agencies. 
Sedimentation and Coastal Erosion 
Loads of sediments arising from soil erosion on land, 
and carried by rivers to be deposited at sea has been recognized 75 
as the most critical marine pollution problem in Eastern Africa. 
In the present case, the discussion surveys the situation on 
sediment loads carried by the Senegal River, especially in view 
of the intensified development activities within the basin. 
Thereafter, we shall turn to the question of coastal erosion. 
74. For the public health impact of the OMVS projects see ibid 
pp. 117-129, 191-192. 
75. For discussions see Okidi, C.O. "Nairobi Convention: Conserv-
ation and Development Imperatives" in Environmental Policy ang 
Law Vol.15, November, 1985 pp. 39-51 and Okidi, "Waste on Laric 
-pollution at the Sea: Priorities for Action in the Eastern 
African Region", in The Siren (News from UNEF's Regional Seas 
Programme) February 1986 pp. 22-26. 
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The studies assessing environmental effects of the 
projects submit that it is almost impossible to quantitatively 
predict changes in sedimentation and erosion regime of a water-
7 6 
course like the Senegal River. They add that, insufficiency 
of the relevant data complicates such a task and therefore only 
some general statements can be made on the subject. 
In the Bafing River, upstream from Manantali, very little 
sediment load is expected, because of the low gradient of the 
bed. As a consequence, the bed sediment transport and deposition 
into the Manantali reservoir will be approximately 5 30,000 metric 
tons per year. At that.rate, it is estimated that the dead 
storage of the Manantali reservoir would take a minimum of MSO 
years to fill. 
Eut studies expect that between Bafoulabe and Bakel the 
increased sediment loads would be contributed by the tributaries, 
especially Ketion-Ko, Kclimbine, Parpara, Bekoye and Feleme 
rivers. On the other hand, between Bakel and Boghe, where there 
are no major tributaries, no major sediment loads are expected. 
Instead sediment deposition in the channel and sand bar develop-
ment will become more pronounced as the river flow will be unable 
to carry the sediments supplied from upstream and from the minor 
tributaries. 
Between Boghe and Diama the impact of the Diama dam will 
enhance the rate of deposition and lead to the gradual filling 
of the reservoir. Moreover, the flow regulation at Manantali 
reservoir is expected to accelerate the sedimentation in the 
Diama reservoir. But little change is expected in the sediment-
ation and erosion between Diama and St. Louis where the regul-
ation at Diama and Manantali dams is expected to reduce the 
erosional and scouring activities. 
Coastal erosion is raised as a question here because of 
the experience already obtained in the Volta river. It has 
been established that the construction of the Akasombo Dam, 
completed in 19G5, reduced the flow rate into the sea thereby 
76. See OMVS, Assessment of Environmental Effects, op. cit. 
pp. 39-42 where the ensuing information is obtained. 
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allowing the force of waves and current to cause serious coastal 
erosion which has destroyed the town of Keta in Ghana, displac-
ing 10,000 people; twice displaced a road; destroyed 30 to 40 
hectares of palm oil plantations; and threatened the old town of 
77 Aneho with its 10,000 inhabitants. In fact, commentators 
think that the final result of the erosion might send the whole 
7 8 of Togo along the road to the fabled continent of Atlantis. 
There are reasons for concern about possible impact of 
Diama Dam on the Coast. The impact studies submit that "coastal 
erosion and sedimentation are too complex to be predicted ade-
quately by analytical techniques". Some preliminary estimates 
predict strong coastal erosion will-affect uptc five kilometres 
cf the beach front south of the entry channel at an erosion 
rate of 200 cubic metres per metre of shoreline. Within ten to 
twenty years the erosion zone is expected to expand as far away 
as 20 kilometres from entry ox the channel. 
The OMVS only recognizes the lack of sufficient in-depth 
study of the estuarine problem and has solicited funds to facili-
tate the study and to identify the alternative mitigation measures. 
The problem exists and it has serious implications. Perhaps, 
this should have been anticipated. 
Municipal and Industrial Wastes 
Environmental problems under these categories are likely 
to arise from four specific sources, namely: Urban population 
increase; Emissions from agro-based industries; Emissions from 
Mining activities; and Discharges from River transportation. 
Although intensified agricultural activity is expected 
to mitigate the r-^ te of rural-urban migration, the populations 
in the Senegal basin are expected to increase dramatically over 
the next fifty years due to natural growth as well as population 
required to operate infrastructures and industries of OMVS. Urban 
population is expected to increase from 241,000 people in 1980 
79 
to 1,490,000 people by the year 2028. This increase will auto-
matically present the basin states with problems of waste disposal, 
77. See a summary of the story in New Africa, August, 1985 p. 27. 
78. ibid. 79. OMVS, Assessment. of~Environmental Effcct, op.cit. 
p. 21. 
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water supply and housing. The easy temptation is to dump or 
drain the wastes into the river if no firm commitment is under-
taken by the basin states. The planning for municipal develop-
ment is currently the responsibility of the member states. 
The use of fertilizers and pesticides seem to be another 
aspect of agricultural industry which carries potential problems. 
Fertilizers pose potential problems for both the surface and 
ground water resources, because of possible contamination and 
eutrophication. Pesticides are also potential contaminants but 
they pose the additional problem that since they are administered 
through aerial spraying they are often carried by air well beyond 
their target areas. An example in point is the contention by 
scientist Edward Wenk, that DDT residues dejected in The Bay of 
8 0 Bengal had actually drifted from East Africa. 
A wide array of agriculture related industries are anti-
cipated within the basin, for some of the industries construc-
81 
tion and implementation have actually commenced. They include 
rice processing and flour production which commenced in 1985 
and tomato canning which commenced in 19 79 and sugar c&ne pro-
cessing which commenced in 19 83. Breweries, cotton mills, 
edible oil refineries, fertilizer production and meat processing 
are yet to commence. These industries are bound to have vast 
loads of wastes for disposal. 
Mining industries are a central consideration in the 
OMVS development programmes. They include copper and iron in 
Senegal; magnetite, iron and bauxite in Mali and copper and 
8 2 
phosphates in Mauritania. Various techniques of mining have 
their adverse environmental consequences to be considered. Then 
the disposal of tailings and other mineral wastes always presents 
problems, particularly for internal waters as has been the ex-
perience of Reserve Mining Company of Duluth, Minnesota which 
persistently released large loads, at one time 67,000 tons of 
taconite rocks into Lake Superior, daily, even though there was 
80. See Wenk, "The physical resources of the Oceans" in Scietific 
American No. 221 (Sept. 1969) pp. 168-169. 
81. OMVS, Assessment of Environmental Effects, op.cit. 
82. See Table B.6-2 pp. 24-25 ibid. 
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established evidence that the rocks have carcinogenic proper-
8 3 
ties. Total disregard of the health implication of such dis-
charges at national level, for lower riparians and for the ocean, 84 could have disastrous consequences even for the OMVS itself. 
Apart from the solid and liquid loads mining and its 
related industries such as smelting often emit large gaseous 
wastes with significant polluting effects. Invariably the gase-
ous wastes* in form of sulpher and nitrogen compounds, are trans-
ported by air to be deposited beyond the limits of the territory 
of origin. It is such problems which brought forth the celeb-
85 
rated Trail Smelter Arbitration between Canada and the United 
States early in this century and the current controversy over 
acid rain in North America and Europe. The makings of these 
problems seem to prevail in the OMVS development plans and some 
form of express obligations by the member states seem appropriate. 
River transportation as an OMVS project poses two cate-
gories of environmental problems. The first category relates 
to the preparation and maintenance of the navigation channels. 
The second category relates to the actual operation of navigation. 
Preparation of the channels, particularly port develop-
ment and dredging, generates wastes, especially sediments which 
must be disposed of properly. This could be a fairly localized 
problem but if released downstream such sediments would hasten 
the filling up of the Diama dam. Besides, the actual dredging or 
the sediments themselves would interfere with the living resources 
of the river especially fisheries and their spawning grounds. 
83. See details in Okidi, C.O. Regional Control of Ocean Pollu-
tion: Legal and Institutional Problems and Prospects CSijthoff 
and Nordhoff, The Netherlands, 1978) p. 73. 
84. These industries will be for the benefit of the respective 
states. If the wastes were to cause the Minamata kinds of 
problems to the citizens of a lower riparian or other coastal-
states the situation would be intolerable. Recall that the 
residents of Minamata and Nagiita in Japan suffered debilit-
ating neurological diseases caused through eating fish contami 
nated with methyl mercury from Japanese industries in 1950's. 
The matter caused a major stire in industry-government rel-
ations and the industries were compelled to pay large compen-
sation to the victims. For background, see ibid pp. 14, 16 
and accompanying footnotes. 
85. "Trail Smelter" Case is reported in United Nations, Report of 
International Arbitral Awards Vol.Ill pp. 1905-1982. 
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Actual navigation usually generates two major types of 
pollution: deliberate and accidental pollution. Deliberate 
pollution arises largely from discharge of bilge water or 
deballasting both of which have been recognised in the existing Q C 
impact studies. On the other hand accidental pollution may 
occur when the cargo-carrying vessels collapse, get into a 
collusion or other forms of destructive accidents. Considering 
that one of the central purposes of the OMVS is to provide 
transportation to meet all needs of the land-locked Mali as 
well as.' Upper Senegal and Mauritania, the range of substances 
which may be carried by the vessels is potentially very vast. 
Any possible spills would have serious effects on the living re-
sources of the river, particularly fish. Additionally, the 
studies recognize that the pollutants would adversely affect 
marine birds associated with Langue de Barbaric National Park. 
In summary it is emphasized that in view of the planned 
development work of the OMVS the potential pollution of the 
Senegal River is a serious problem. The experience of the Rhine 
in Europe is a clear example as the industries in riparian states 
have often found it attractive to dump waste into the river. 
Very often it is the massive death of fish in the river alert 
the riparian to pollution. Water of the river is rendered totally 
unusable anc the Netherlands, as the lowest riparian suffering 
the heaviest nuisance from upstream states. Here the need for 
clear obligation as to the normative standards and institutional 
procedures for prevention of adverse environmental effects seem 
imperative. 
The constituent Instruments and the adverse changes 
By the constituent instruments of the OMVS we should 
refer to the two conventions signed or. the 11 March 1972. One 
is the Convention Relative to the status of the river Senegal; 
the other is the Convention Establishing the Organization for 
the Development of the Senegal River. 
The Convention establishing the CMVS aid not explicitly 
make any provisions for the above range of environmental problemc 
with national and international implication. On the other hand 
86. OMVS, Aogtfssment of Environmental Effects op.cit. pp.168,177. 
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the convention relating to the status of the Senegal River ex-
plicitly recognized the necessity to ascertain possible adverse 
environmental effects of the projects. 
Legal and institutional provisions on environmental matters 
Both of the constituent instruments were concerned primarily 
with utilization of the waters of the Senegal River for irrig-
ation, navigation and hydro-electric power generation. There-
fore, a concern with the adverse environmental matters discussed 
above, if they are there should be completely explicit end not 
to be confused with other provisions on water utilization. 
The convention establishing the OMVS did not have such an 
explicit provision. The nearest it came to that is in the first 
paragraph of Article 15 which requires the Secretariat General 
to prepare and submit to the Council of Ministers, "joint prog-
rammes of study ana works for coordinating development and rational 
exploitation of the Senegal River resources" (emphasis adasd). 
The supposition is that rational exploitation implies prevention 
of wastes and deleterous effects. This is in fact, tantamount 
to requiring the Secretariat General to conduct an impact assess-
ment. It does not imply any obligation on the part of the OMYS 
or its member states to prevent adverse environmental consequences 
of the projects. 
The same provision comes out in modified form under Article 
14 in the amendments to the convention adopted cn the 11 December 
1979. The modification is requiring the High Commission (newly 
created in place' of the Secretariat General) as the executive arm 
to collaborate with the Permanent Water Commission (la Commission 
Permanente des Eaux) of the Council of Ministers, to ensure that 
hydro-agricultural projects (or irrigation) get fair shares of 
the water resources. Again that does not express any rights or 
obligations on any of the environmental matters as discussed above. 
The Convention Relating to the status of the Senegal River 
is relatively more explicit on environmental matters. What is 
true is that the central theme of the convention is uninhibited 
to use the river for navigation, a point which finds forceful ex-
pression in the entire convention. But Article 4 provides that: 
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"Ho project likely to sensibly change the characteris-
tics of the river, its state and navigability, its state 
with regard to agricultural or industrial exploitation, 
quality of its waters, biological characteristics of its 
fauna or flora, its water level, may be executed without 
prior approval of the contracting states and actual just-
8 7 ification of the consequences" 
The critical obligation here is the requirement for prior 
approval before a project is undertaken, which goes beyond the 
popular prior consultation. The latter is the general practice 
in international water law. The general understanding is that 
the consultations would lead to an acceptable modality in the 
proposed project, but it also implies the right of the proposing 
state to proceed with the project without express approval. 
Thus, the requirement for prior approval means that a 
state which considers its economic or environmental interests 
likely to be injured by a project can actually veto the proposed 
project. The implication, of course, is that that once a state 
approves a project then it is stopped from legally complaining 
should it suffer economic or environmental injuries. That 
should then be the significant package of environmental rights 
and obligation in the constituent instruments of the OMVS. 
Juxtaposed against the environmental problems discussed 
above, this provision still leaves considerable room to promote 
rights and obligations in environmental matters. In the first 
place, as it is, the provision does not provide specific machinery 
for assessment of the project document or to redress any disagree-
ments in the studies. Presumably, this is left for resolution 
by the council of Ministers or the regular machinery for settle-
ment of disputes under article 20 of the convention both of which 
are too general and politicized to deal with the technical 
questions. A technical machinery for the processing environ-
mental impact assessment should be located within the OMVS and 
properly provided for in the constituent instruments. 
87. See Boubacar op. cit., p. 8 and OMVS, River Senegal op.cit. 
(1979) p.9. 
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There are several ways of strengthening the legal oblig-
ation under the OMVS conventions on Environmental matters to 
ensure complete, coverage of the environmental problems discussed 
above. In a summary form, one may suggest the following additional 
provisions: 
(a) It could help a complete, appreciation of the rights and 
obligations in environmental matters if the constituent instru-
ments had explicitly provided that the purpose cf the OMVS is 
to ensure rational and integrated basin wide development to 
imply rational management of the natural resources, prevention 
of environmental injuries and protection of native flora and 
fauna, protection of public health and to ensure husbandry of 
the resources to ensure present development needs and the future 
de velopme nt inte re s ts. 
(b) The constituent instruments should provide that in its 
common work the OMVS is under obligation to ensure that its 
activities do not cause adverse environmental effects within 
the project area. Secondly, that such projects do not cause 
injuries in any other areas beyond the jurisdiction of the member 
states. 
(c) There should have been an obligation to the effect that 
all projects conducted within the plans of the OMVS shall ensure 
protection of health and well-being of individuals resident 
within the contracting states.( (Perhaps the previsions should 
cover individuals resident in contiguous states too). 
(d) There should be provisions for administrative and judicial 
remedies in each of the basin states, for individuals or groups 
who are victims of environmental injuries arising from the OMVS 
projects. 
(e) OMVS member states should adopt the standards for the 
prevention of pollution from ships as well as for dumping of 
wastes to the navigation of the Senegal River. Respectively, 
there are standards under the 1973 international convention for 
the prevention of pollution from ships together with its 1978 
Protocol, and the 1972 London Convention on Dumping of Wastes 
and other matter, both of which provide basic global standards. 
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These provisions could strengthen the work of the OMVS 
and promote rational and integrated management•of the natural 
resources of the basin. As it is the OMVS has definitely, shown 
consciousness to environmental imperatives in its work by 
conducting assessment of environmental effects of the develop-
ment projects - which are cited in the present discussion. 
These studies have, moreover, shown the mitigating measures 
against every one of the environmental problems indicated. In 
fact, it was learned during this study that the Republic of 
Senegal at one point stopped the USe OX laiD a Flintstone as 
concrete and aggregate for the Diama impoundment because of 
the environmental impacts of that excavation. They show an 
acute sensitivity to environmental exigencies regardless of the 
implications for the rate of dam construction. But that kind 
of policy consciousness should have been backed by broader 
obligations for environmental protection in the constituent 
instruments or later in a protocol or additional convention. 
(f) One further critical environmental question relates to 
insurance of the main source of the water for the Senegal in 
Fouta Dhallon mountains. The critical Manantali project relies 
on the waters from the greater water tank of VJest Africa in 
Fouta Djallon highlands located largely in Guinea. Yet the 
concern of the OMVS seems to end with Manantali, neglecting the 
question of conservation of the catchment area of the Fouta 
Djallon. 
Granted that Guinea is not a member of the OMVS and there-
fore the conservation of that source of water cannot be an 
entirely OMVS affair. But in fact, that should be the more 
important reason why officially, the OMVS should adopt specific 
procedures for negotiating the security of that water and even 
participating with costs , in the conservation of. the source of 
the resource, without which conceptions of OMVS projects would 
be totally altered. 
A project for the integrated development of the Fouta 
Djallon Highlands was initiated in 1979 as a collaborative 
effort of the OAU, UNDP, UNSO, UNESCO, FAO, WHO and the govern-
ment of Guinea. It is the unique environmental problem in Africa 
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During discussions with the officials of the OMVS and 
OMVG in Dakar it was revealed that only the OMVG has initiated 
some consultations with the Fouta Djallon project towards sub-
stantive collaboration, possibly with a budgetary input. In 
fact the Fouta Djallon project has taken into account the work 
of the OMVG cover about 12,000 square kilometres of the Fouta 
Djallon massif and that this describes the area of possible 
collaboration between two projects to avoid duplication. 
It seems imperative that the OMVS should formally enter 
into an agreement with the Fouta Djallon project, and perhaps 
the Government of Guinea over modalities for OMVS contribution 
to the conservation measures and integrated development of the 
source of water for the CMVS project. 
(g) The machinery for the settlement of disputes should be 
more clearly articulated. The questions of integrated manage-
ment of drainage basins for development will be a unique 
subject requiring examination by a uniquely selected set of 
experts. Such a panel should be made up of persons who are 
versed in the intricate management questions of drainage basins 
and to adopt more of the consensual rather than adversary 
approach in their deliberations. 
(h) As a back up to the foregoing procedure for settlement 
of disputes there should be a provision for ultimate resort 
to an Arbitral or Judicial machineries if the consensual 
machinery^fails. Most polities would prefer an arbitral pro-
cedure rather than the International Court of Justice because 
of the flexibility offered by the former in selection of the 
jurists as well as procedural and substantive provisions which 
might be stipulated in the compromise. 
The very fact that there is provision for possible resort 
to this procedure entailing binding decisions might, in fact, 
induco the states conccrned to make the first consensual procedure 
88. The involvement of the OAU in the Fouta Djallon project star-
ted with the Council of Ministers' Resolution CM/Res 75 6 
(XXXIIIO Rev.l on the Biological Development of the Fouta 
Djallon Mountain adopted in Monrovia in July 1979 and Council 
o1 Ministers' Resolution CM/Res.811 (XXXV) on Integrated Deve-
lopment Project for the Fouta Djallon Highlands adopted at 
Freetown in June 1980. 
(i) The package as above should clearly stipulate the duration 
within which, if the consensual procedure fails then one or both 
of the parties nay take the matter to the arbitral or judicial 
machinery. The shorter that duration the better. Environmental 
problems, by their nature, may reach irriversible or highly 
detrimental proportions if the problems are not resolved quickly. 
There is no magical number, but a maximum of twenty-four months 
should be reasonable. 
VI. FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR THE OliVS PROJECTS 
The financial requirements for the integrated Management 
and development in the drainage basins is invariably enormous 
and the return to the investments have long gestation periods. 
These factors account for the scantiness of the resources for 
these projects and the fact that government guarantees are 
89 
essential for the procurement of such funds. In fact this • 
well accounts in part, for the fact that African states have not 
commenced active management of the vast energy and water re-
source potentials in the continent. 
The OMVS has gene the farthest in all African attempts 
at drainage basin management. This section will briefly discuss 
the arrangement for financing common works as adopted under the 
OMVS subsidiary convention adopted for the purpose in May 1982. 
Secondly, we shall briefly look at the sources and amounts of 
money already committed to the OMVS. Thirdly, some intractable 
investment sectors will be outlined. Finally, a few points of 
conditions for easing problems of development will be highlighted 
One of the central problems inhibiting integrated drain-
age basin management within the framework of a regional authority 
is that most prospective donors are unwilling to put money into 
actual investment by the cuthoritv. This position held force-
fully by the United States prefers bilateral financial arrange-
ments with individual states rather than organization. Yet in 
most cases, the key projects such as dams or navigational channel 
€9. See more discussion in Okidi, C.O. "The role of the State in 
the Management of International River and Lake Basins in 
Africa" May 19 86, 30 pages being a manuscript prepared ir. 
this study series. 
This work is licensed under a 
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and ports are projects of regional character often for common 
benefit by all the basin states. 
For these reasons the OMVS member states concluded on the 
one hand the Convention Relating, to the Legal status of Common 
Works on December 12, 1978. That convention was discussed in 
Section III above. It will be recalled that under Article 3 
that convention identified the common works or projects to in-
clude: The Manantali Dam; the Diana Dam, the Sea-River Port at 
Saint Louis; the River Port at Kayes; the ports of call and 
management of the navigable channels; and assessories or annex to 
the foregoing projects. 
Thereafter, the contracting parties adopted a new conven-
tion on Financial Arrangements for common projects on 12th Kay 
19 82. By Title II, Article 2 of the convention sources of 
finance for common projects were identified as follows: 
(a) Contributions made by member states 
()>) Loans contracted by the states but ceded to the OMVS 
(c) Subventions, grants and payments, including technical 
assistance 
(d) Loans contracted by the OMVS with or without guarantee 
by the member states. 
Even though the High Commissioner is recognised by the 
convention as the principal administrator cf the projects, and 
also empowered to negotiate and contract loans on behalf of the 
OMVS, Article 4 of the 19 82 convention requires that all the 
loan contracts must be submitted to the Council of Ministers 
for vettifig and approval. Where the financier requires guarantees 
by one or more member states such a condition must be stipulated 
in the memorandum to the council of Ministers. In any case, the 
member state would be expected to givo its guarantee in direct 
proportion to its participation in the project. (Article 8) 
In each case, the guarantors are individually responsible for 
all appropriate measures to repay the principal sum, interest 
or service charges. 
Where the money raised is insufficient to meet the cost 
of the respective common project then the co-guarantors are 
required to make up for the difference, but only in direct 
proportion to their participation in the project. The money 
paid is considered simply as an advance payment to the organiz-
ation, to be reimbursed to the respective co-guarantors when 
the funds become available. 
It should be noted that, in actual practice only the 
West German Agency, KFVJ, has extended loan directly to the OMVS, 
with the guarantee by the member states. The other financiers 
have opted to deal directly with tha member states. 
The critical question of cost sharing for the common 
wcrks was resolved through a study financed by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and conducted by Utah 
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State University through a grant cf US$ 640,000. The complex 
study based on computer model of indeces of benefit frcm OMVS 
projects came up with ratios which were adopted by the council 
of Ministers on May 6, 1981 as follows:91 
Mali 36.95% 
Mauritania 16.69% 
Senegal 46.36% 
The share of responsibility of each state may be adjusted 
by the council of Ministers, on request by any state. But each 
amount assessed before such an agreement remains valid and 
binding on the respective states. On the other hanc, if the 
Council of Ministers is unable to agree on the; scope of adjust-
ment, then the matter is forwarded to the Assembly of Heads of 
State for resolution. The OMVS advises the financiers of the 
changes accordingly. 
The financial needs of the OMVS cannot be determined with 
any precision because cf the changing costs and evolution of 
projects and their follow up constructions. For Diana and 
Manantali Dams alone, the UJJDP was able to compile the following 
commitments by the beginning of 198U (reflecting situation by 
mid 1962 ) : 
90. USAID, OMVS Fiscal Allocation Responsibility, Data and Insti-
tutional Development (Dakar: USAID/Senogal Project No.625-
0G20A 1962 ) . 
91. Resolution No.iu3/CM/SH/D of 5th 1981 is citod by Eoubacar 
cp • cit. p. 35. It is 'uiKi<rjLood that the model was to under-
go aodi tic.na.1 ivfinr-:/irnt. 
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Source Total 
in 000s of US$ 
Diama Reserve Manantali 
Saudi Arabia 150,000 28,478 - 121,522 
Kuwait 100,000 15,000 1,000 84,000 
VJest Germany 87,268 - - 87,268 
France 69,972 63 ,987 - 5,985 
ADB/ADF 61,480 22,040 7,060 3 2,3 80 
Abu Dhabi 70,000 14,167 - 55,833 
Italy 36,000 - - 38,000 
European Dev. Fund 88,725 11,5 40 3,072 74,113 
Islamic Dev. Eank 20,000 - - 20,000 
Canada • 21,158 - - 21,000 
USAID (Resettlement 
only) 10,000 _ - 10,000 
Iraq + 40,000 - 20,000 20,000 
Iran 4,000 - 4 ,000 -
UNDP++ 10,000 1,150 6,790 2,060 
Member States 51,213 - 51,213 -
821,616 156,362 93,135 572,319 
Note, however, that implementation of the contribution of 
Iraq was suspended in 1983'because of the war situation at 
home. 
++ UNDP amounts include regional as well as national IPF con-
tributions . 
In all, the above amount equalled 99 percent of the 
needs for the two dams. Obviously, then the actual amount 
is slightly over one billion dollars for the two dams and 
immediately related works. 
Except for the USAID and the UNDP the other contributions 
are in form of loans with periods of grace, maturity and in-
terest rates not reflected above. 
The construction of Diana Dam was done by Trench firms 
while that of Manantali was by German firms. As will be re-
called from the discussions on projects above, these firms 
tended to sub-contract, where necessary to firms from their homes 
of origin. This implies that most of the funds raised for the 
projects were immediately paid outside of the contracting states, 
particularly to France and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(Perhaps France and Germany should have made higher contribu-
tions to the two projects!) This fact might have significant 
implications for attitudes of the other states contributing to 
the projects. But in fact, it has far-reaching implications 
for the OMVS states who have to repay the loans since the money 
does not get a chance to circulate in their national economies, 
yet the gestation of the investment in the dams will take a 
long time before economic returns are realized. The consequence 
is that the states have to sesk funds from elsewhere to repay 
the loan, a matter which mear.s heavy burdens for the economy. 
It is for this reason that some observers have mentioned 
that large scale river and lake basin development actually lead Q2 
to economic disasters for the states involved." They argue 
that it is not possible in a situation like Senegal to speak 
of agricultural output as a source of the financial require-
ments for loan repayment. 
For hydro-electric power observers from the energy industry 
submit that the necessarily huge per capita investments for the 
large dams make their economy rationality doubtful. According 
9 3 
to Olorunfemi and Ogunsola, the unit cost factor for large 
dams is US$ 1,100 per KW, while the figure may reach US$ 3,000 
per KW for small dams. They add that although hydro-power schemes 
have the advantage of serving multiple objectives, to include 
irrigation and flood control, its development is often hampered 
by costs. 
Be that as it may, it seems imperative in the OMVS context 
that the members must move fast towards intensified agricultural 
productivity as well as use of hydro-power in industry and mining 
if they are to avoid being overwhelmed by the loan repayments. 
92. See extensive arguments by Tetteh A. Kofi, "Economics of Capit 
Intensive River and Lake Basin Development projects and Under-
development in West Africa" a paper presented at a Seminar on 
river and Lake Basins Development in West Africa, organized bv 
IDEP/ECA (in collaboration with OMVS) in Dakar, Senegal 25-2G 
June 19 86. 
93. Olorunfemi, M.A. and 0.0. Ogunsola both of Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, Lagos, presented a paper entitled "Pros 
pectives and Prospects for Self Reliance in Energy" at the 
International Economic Association Conference in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 26-30 July 1983. see p. 6. 
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In concluding this section, here below are some intract-
able considerations which need attention in the budget prepar-
ations. 
First, the two dams have now been completed. Very soon 
the operational and maintenance costs will emerge. Presumably 
these could initially be funded from that amount held as "Reserve". 
But that can only be a short term measure. Resources for this 
problem must be sought urgently, just as resources for hydro-
power production and transportation system will have to be found. 
Secondly, training and manpower development for the OMVS 
administrative and productive institutions will be done in 
earnest. This is not reflected in the above amounts. Building of 
local institutions is a prerequisite as well as an indicator 
of development and these African countries should not build the 
massive infrastructure ar.d expect to depend on expatriates to 
operate it. These countries must, in fact, try to avoid 
such dependency because no country has ever realized develop-
ment while wholly depending on foreign manpower. The interviews 
with officials of OMVS in June 19 61 revealed that very little 
was actually being done in the area of manpower development 
even though institutionally their awareness of the need is 
evidenced by creation of a division for human resources develop-
ment . 
Thirdly, it is often the case that when financial resources 
are scarce environmental concerns tend to be relegated. The 
section on environmental implications highlighted some of the 
possible environmental problems for which mitigating measures 
require full budgetary considerations. If these steps are not 
taken, then development goals in plan might be totally undermined 
by the adverse environmental factors. Just see the problems dis-
cussed above. 
Finally, research and development require major budgetary 
allocations. With research in agronomy, acquaculture, silvicul-
ture, energy options and public health, most of the development 
programmes will fail. But research and development is expensive 
and it requires impeccable commitment. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The tottering conditions of the economies of most of the 
African countries has forcefully justified concerted efforts 
at integrated management of the African drainage basins in an 
effort to boost the performance in the agricultural and indust-
rial sectors. Tne assumption in this respect is that persis-
tent and widespread drought as well as the high cost cf imported 
conventional energy resources have exacerbated the already under-
developed economies. Therefore, integrated management must 
entail, fundamentally, the regulation of the flow of the rivers 
to facilitate, on the one hand, irrigated agriculture, and on 
the other, production cf hydro-electric power as a reliable 
source of energy. It is presumed that with the cheap indigenous 
source of energy and agricultural output the countries would 
have basic resources to prop up their socio-economic development 
through food self-sufficiency and industrialization. 
The study of the OMVS development programmes show a remark-
able level of programming for irrigated agriculture, hydro-
electric power production, navigation for transportation, live-
stock production, fisheries, mining, forestry and general indust-
rialization. But the history of the evolution of the OMVS also 
shows a great deal of learning experience which started during 
the last century, both for national level initiatives and attempts 
at international co-operation. In fact, one cannot help wondering 
why despite repeated history of drought in this Sahelian zone the 
culture of irri.gated agriculture never caught on here the way it 
did in Egypt, Sudan and Madagascar in Africa. Somehow the efforts 
to cultivate public and private initiatives in irrigated agricul-
ture show a rather dismal record of performance. The irrigation 
development institutions such as SAED in Senegal, SONADER in 
Mauritania and OVSTM in Mali have in the past performed poorly as 
they remain remote from the farmers and insensitive to the needs 
94. That the economies of the majority of African countries arc 
tottering is evidenced by distressing decision to convene the 
special session of the U.N. General Assembly in May 1986 to dis 
cuss Africa's Economic crisis. A summary of the relevant re-
source and development potentials of the international drain-
age basins in Africa is given by Okidi, "The Role of the State 
in the Management of International River and Lake Basins in 
Africa" op. cit. 
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and exigencies of the farming communities. Their staff members 
have apparently heeded the political support behind their 
appointments rather than commitment to excellence in their field 
work. The recent OMVS studies of social and economic require-
ments for organization of the system of production have recog-
nized the past weaknesses. And here seems to lie the strongest 
challenge to the OMVS under the present programmes. 
The challenge in the area of hydro-electric energy produc-
tion and utilization depends largely in the preparedness in 
the areas of industrialization and mining. Several critical 
observers suggest 'that OMVS kind of energy plans are bound to 
plunge the economies of the member states into a disaster 
because the unit cost of the investment is so high that repay-
ment of the loans is prohibitive. It is hypothesized though, 
that if mining and industrial utilization of the energy are 
intensified from the start of power production then the users 
are likely to pay the loans at accessible rates. The tragedy 
might only arise if the range of consumers is limited, with a 
heavy reliance on the domestic or municipal power supplies. 
Then the tariffs would be so high that it would be non-develop-
mental. Additionally, the mining or industrial power consumers 
are only well cff if the tariffs are accessible and therefore 
developmental. This is the reason why such users should be 
diverse and all ready by the time production commences so that 
they take advantage of the grace periods allowed before loan 
repayment. Whatever is the case, all these arrangements require 
professional discipline and commitment among the employees of 
the OMVS. Whether these qualities will exist is still to be 
seen.. 
The evolution of the legal and institutional arrangements 
upto the creation of the OMVS offers a vast lesson for other 
African basins. It is clear that despite the long history in 
the arrangements for the Senegal/^ b¥fiinrtiemljer states still had 
several after-thoughts following the adoption of the OMVS Con-
vention in March 1972. This is evidenced by the number of amend-
ments adopted thereafter. It is also evidenced by the realiz-
ation that they needed a convention on the legal status of their 
common projects and later, a convention on the financial arrange-
ments for such works. For purposes of actual development projects 
future drainage basin organizations in Africa have a great 
deal to learn from the evolution of the legal and institutional 
regime developed by the OMVS states. 
Of course, within that context there are such anomalies 
as the absence of Guinea from the organization. Guinea would 
be a significant partner partly, because it would give effect 
to the aspiration cf the OMVS statesto deal with the entire 
Senegal basin as a Unit, and partly because the Fouta Djallon 
highlands as a catchment area, is the source of water on which 
most of the OMVS projects rely. In fact, non-participation of 
Guinea might have led OMVS to ignore the question of conservation 
of Fouta 'Djallon highlands even though OAU - coordinated project 
for integrated development of the range has actually been in 
process since 1979. On the whole it seems that failvre to 
either include the Fouta Djallon conservation in its constituent 
instruments as an imperative, or to include it in their sub-
sequent development programmes is simply part of the broader 
consideration of vital environmental matters in the constituent 
instruments of the OMVS. 
To their credit, the OMVS states took into account the 
necessity to do an assessment of the environmental impact of 
the development projects. That is expressed in practice. But 
constituent instruments never provided any obligations of the 
states to prevent environmental injuries that might result from 
agricultural, industrial or mining activities. Hoi"' yet did the 
instruments provide for institutional machineries for determin-
ing the completeness or resolution cf any negative impacts which 
might be assessed. This situation suggests that even the impact 
assessment required by the Convention Relating to the Legal 
Status of the Senegal River is more of a gesture than a matter 
of seriousness. The discussions above have suggested some of 
the necessary principles which would be desirable in international 
river basin conventions. These include, inter alia, an expressed 
principle that an integrated management of a drainage basin for 
development entails sustainable utilization of the resources; 
that the organization and the contracting states shall undertake 
to prevent their activities from causing deleterious environmental 
effects anywhere; and provision for administrative and legal 
remedies for states and citizens to obtain redress for any 
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environmental injuries. At the international level the 
machinery for settlement of disputes should combine a technical 
panel taking the consensual approach in conciliation with an 
arbitral or judicial machinery should the former fail after a 
stipulated duration. 
It is argued here that failure to include those restraints 
in the convention and in practice might lead to negation of 
some fundamental development goals. 
Promotion of development includes provision of safe 
drinking water, safe food resources for nutrition; conserv-
ation of soil with its fertility to support agriculture; 
protection of public health ensuring productive population; and 
protection of the diversity of natural resources which support 
social and industrial development. 
Only the experience with actual implementation will con-
firm if the legal instruments are themselves complete enough 
for development purposes of The OMVS. The history of efforts 
by the OMVS states already suggest that it is important that 
in these formative stages, African countries should as far as 
possible confine themselves to the technical problems of socio-
economic development in drainage basin management. Attempts 
to include broader questions of political integration as was 
included in the OERS seem rather treacherous. The experience 
of the OERS also confirms that programmes on drainage basin 
management are susceptible to interruption by totally extreneous 
issues: The coup d'etat against Madeibo Kcita in Mali did upset 
Sekou Tojjre to the total detriment of the development programmes 
of the OERS.95 
95. African countries do not seem to run out of such political 
problems especially those relating to irridentist movements. 
On the one hand, the African states condemn colonialists for 
having artificially parcelled out the continet to suit their 
needs - almost as if the leaders would like to reunite Africa 
On the other hand they legally adhere tc the doctrine of uti_ 
possidetis which means that the boundaries must remain where 
they were at the time of independence. The recent open con-
flicts Between Mali and Burkina Taso do not augur well for 
the future of technical and development cooperation in the 
region. Tortunately, both States have accepted the solution 
£iven in the ICJ decision in December 1986. 
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In the case of the OMVS, the member states need a clear 
resolve to deploy personnel on the basis of competence, allocate 
sufficient resources and to insist that employees retain positions 
only on the basis of proven record of productivity, accountability, 
commitment and integrity. It would be a rather expensive mockery 
now if the programmes were to fail. 
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